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 1 
Nottebohm’s Nightmare: Have We Exorcised the Ghosts of WWII Detention 
Programs or Do They Still Haunt Guantanamo? 
 
Cindy G. Buys 1
 
 
This article has been revised from the version published in 2011 in order to reflect several 
corrections. 
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 Frederich Nottebohm was the subject of a famous decision by the International Court of 
Justice that is mentioned in almost every international law text book published in the United 
States.2  The Nottebohm judgment deals with the narrow legal issue of whether Guatemala must 
respect Liechtenstein’s hasty grant of citizenship to Mr. Nottebohm during World War II.3  
However, the story of how Mr. Nottebohm’s case came to the world court exposes a little known 
program run by the United States during World War II in which the United States pressured 
Latin American countries like Guatemala to identify persons of German nationality or ancestry 
and turn them over to the United States for internment for the duration of the war.  Many of these 
persons were assumed to be Nazi sympathizers and were arrested and detained for lengthy 
periods of time on the basis of mere accusations unsupported by any real investigation or 
evidence.  Sadly, as with the Japanese-Americans who were thrown into detention camps during 
World War II,4
Originally, the U.S. Latin American Detention Program was primarily motivated by 
national security concerns, especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.  
However, as time went on, the United States continued detaining persons who, like the 
Nottebohms, had been deemed to present little or no security risk because it was beneficial for 
the United States and Latin American governments to do so for economic reasons.  Thus, what 
 U.S. and international law at the time allowed these arrests and detentions of 
persons of  German ancestry or nationality without requiring any further proof of Nazi 
sympathies, much less subversive activities. 
                                                 
2 The Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (1955).  See generally, Janis & Noyes, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND COMMENTARY 340 (3d ed. 2006); Damrosch et al, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 463 
(5th ed. 2009).  
3 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Guatemala did not have to respect that grant of citizenship 
because Nottebohm lacked sufficient genuine links to Liechtenstein.  See id. 
4 See Koramatsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) (American citizen of Japanese descent challenged 
constitutionality of “Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. 
Army which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area.”);  
see also Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942) and Proclamation No. 2525 (Dec. 7, 1941) 
(declaring all natives or citizens of Japan found in the United States to be enemy aliens subject to detention).  
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started as a national security measure evolved into a program aimed at increasing U.S. economic 
influence in Latin America. 
This article begins by recounting the story of Mr. Frederich Nottebohm, a German-born 
businessman from Guatemala, and how he and his extended family came to be caught up in the 
U.S. Latin American Detention Program.5
                                                 
5 The historical records do not indicate an official name for this program so for convenience I use the descriptive 
title: “U.S. Latin American Detention Program.”  
  It next relates the motivations behind the creation of 
the program and analyzes the legality of the program under both United States and international 
law existing at the time.  The article then examines the extent to which the law has evolved and 
whether the changes in the law would lead to a different result today.  The article draws parallels 
between the arrest, detention and trial of alleged “alien enemies” during World War II and those 
practices being employed today with respect to alleged “unlawful enemy combatants” in the 
current fight against terrorism.  Finally, the article suggests some lessons that may be learned 
regarding the treatment of so-called “alien enemies” during times of conflict, especially relevant 
for current U.S. policies regarding the arrest, detention and trial of suspected foreign terrorists.   
 4 
I. Frederich Nottebohm’s Story 
Frederich Nottebohm was born in Hamburg, Germany on September 16, 1881 into a 
family of eight children.6  After spending two years in South Africa as a young man, he 
emigrated to Guatemala in 1905 at the age of 24.7  Shortly thereafter, he entered into business 
with his brothers, Arturo and Juan, in Guatemala City in a firm called Nottebohm Hermanos.8  
Nottebohm Hermanos was a very successful firm engaged in commerce and banking and which 
owned several coffee plantations in Guatemala.9  In fact, by the 1930s, Nottebohm Hermanos 
was the second largest coffee producer in Guatemala.10  The Nottebohm family had many other 
business interests in multiple countries and was considered one of the oldest, wealthiest, and 
most influential families in Guatemala and Central America.11  Frederich became a partner in the 
firm in 1912 and later became head of the firm in 1937, upon the death of his brother, Arturo.12
The Nottebohm family and business interests first fell under suspicion for ties to 
Germany during World War I.  The U.S. government, through the office of the Alien Property 
Custodian, declared Nottebohm Hermanos to be an alien enemy under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act (TWEA)
   
13 and seized all property of Nottebohm Hermanos in the United States.14
                                                 
6 Id. at 13.  Depending on whether the German, Spanish or English spelling of his name is used, Mr. Nottebohm’s 
first name may appear as Friedrich, Frederico or Frederich. 
  
The United States government believed that Nottebohm Hermanos was owned at least in part by 
7 “Memorandum for the Chief of the Review Section: Frederico Wilheim Nottebohm” (Apr. 22, 1944), Box 758, 
DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
8 Nottebohm, supra note 2.  Juan Nottebohm is also known as Johannes Nottebohm.  
9 Id.; see also “Memorandum for the Chief of the Review Section: Frederico Wilheim Nottebohm,” (Apr. 22, 1944), 
Box 758, DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD.  
10 David McGreery, RURAL GUATEMALA 1760-1940 234 (1994). 
11 See “Memorandum for the Chief of the Review Section: Karl Heinz Nottebohm” (Apr. 30, 1944), Box 716, DOJ 
Alien Enemy Case Files, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
12 Nottebohm, supra note 2.  Arturo’s son, Karl Heinz Nottebohm, who had been born in Guatemala, also became a 
junior partner in the firm at this time. Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE 3 (Dec. 
27, 1945) at 3; see also “Memorandum re Citizenship Status of Karl Heinz Nottebohm” (Oct. 17, 1949), Thomas 
Corcoran Papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
13 50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (2006).     
14 See Nottebohm Hermanos v. McGrath and Clark, Civil Action 1509-50 (D.D.C.), Answer and Counterclaim, in 
Thomas Corcoran papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.   
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German nationals, who were deemed to be enemy aliens.15  Following the war, the Nottebohms 
were able to demonstrate to the U.S. government that only long-term residents of Guatemala had 
any interest in Nottebohm Hermanos and that the company was not an enemy or ally of an 
enemy within the meaning of the TWEA.16 Accordingly, the U.S. government released and 
returned the property to Nottebohm Hermanos pursuant to the settlement of the lawsuit brought 
following the war.17
Between 1905 and 1939, Frederich Nottebohm occasionally returned to Germany or 
visited other countries for business or vacation, but he continued to have his permanent residence 
in Guatemala.
 
18  One of the other countries he visited during this time was Liechtenstein, where 
another brother, Dr. Hermann Nottebohm, had resided since 1931.19
In 1938, Guatemala passed a new law which allowed persons born in Guatemala of 
German parents to renounce Germany and obtain Guatemalan citizenship.
 
20
                                                 
15 Id. 
  Frederich’s 
nephews and junior business partners, Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm, took advantage of this 
16 Id.  The U.S. government later contested these representations, contending that Johannes Nottebohm, a resident 
and citizen of Germany, and Nottebohm & Co. of Hamburg Germany, held ownership interests in Nottebohm 
Hermanos at the relevant time.  The government relied on these contested facts to resist return of the Nottebohms’ 
property after World War II.  Answer and Counterclaim in Civil Action No. 1509-50, Thomas Corcoran Papers, Box 
505, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. As described in more detail below, the parties 
ultimately reached a settlement of the matter in 1958. 
17 Agreement dated December 21, 1950, in Thomas Corcoran papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 
18 J. Mervyn Jones, The Nottebohm Case, 5 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 230, 231 (Apr. 1956). 
19 See id.; see also Nottebohm, supra note 2 at 8; Dr. Erwin Loewenfeld, Nationality and the Right of Protection in 
International Law, 42 TRANSACTIONS OF A GROTIUS SOCIETY, PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INT’L L.: 
TRANSACTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1956, 5, 6 (1956). 
20 Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, supra note 12. 
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law to become Guatemalan citizens,21 but because Frederich had been born in Germany, he 
remained ineligible for Guatemalan citizenship.22
  Perhaps sensing the coming of the war, in March of 1939, Frederich Nottebohm 
conferred a power of attorney on the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos and left Guatemala for 
Hamburg, Germany.
  
23  While Frederich was traveling in Europe, World War II officially began 
with Germany’s invasion of Poland.24  Shortly thereafter, Frederich traveled to Vaduz, 
Liechtenstein to visit his brother, Dr. Hermann Nottebohm, and to apply for Liechtenstein 
citizenship.25  Nottebohm’s citizenship application was quickly approved and on October 20, 
1939, he received a certificate of naturalization as a Liechtenstein citizen.26  Under both German 
and Liechtenstein law, Nottebohm lost his German citizenship by virtue of becoming a citizen of 
Liechtenstein.27
Nottebohm then made preparations to return to Guatemala, including having the 
Guatemalan Consul General in Switzerland enter a visa in his new Liechtenstein passport.
 
28
                                                 
21 See Petition for Habeas Corpus filed in U.S. ex rel. Kurt Nottebohm v. W. S. Cook (U.S. Dist Ct. ND, Dec. 20, 
1945), Box 540, DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, “Nottebohm, Kurt,” RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD; 
see also Stephen Fox, AMERICA’S INVISIBLE GULAG: A BIOGRAPHY OF GERMAN-AMERICAN INTERNMENT & 
EXCLUSION IN WORLD WAR II 105 (2000) (discussing Kurt Nottebohm’s Guatemalan birth and renunciation of 
German citizenship). 
  
Upon his return to Guatemala in early 1939, Nottebohm informed the Guatemalan authorities of 
his acquiring Liechtenstein citizenship and asked that the Guatemalan register of foreign 
22 Guatemalan citizenship laws appear to have been amended several times in the inter-war period, such that there 
may have been a brief period of time when Frederich Nottebohm may have been eligible to apply for Guatemalan 
citizenship.  However, he never did so.   Regardless, by government decree in the 1940s, Guatemala decided not to 
recognize any changes in citizenship after 1938. See L.F.E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 Int’l & Comp. L Q. 1251, 
1271 (1963); Loewenfeld,  supra note 19 at 7. 
23 Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 13. 
24 Invasion of Poland: German Attack Across All Frontiers, THE TIMES (Sept. 2, 1939), available at 
http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/viewArticle.arc?articleId=ARCHIVE-The_Times-1939-09-02-10-
001&pageId=ARCHIVE-The_Times-1939-09-02-10 
25 Nottebohm, supra note 2 at 15.  Frederich Nottebohm filed his Liechtenstein citizenship application on October 9, 
1939. See Goldie, supra note 22 at 1269 (1963); Jones, supra note 18.  
26 Nottebohm, supra note 2 at 15; Jones, supra, note 18 at 232. 
27 See Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at 12; Goldie, supra note 22, at 1269. 
28 Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. at 16-17; Jones, supra, note 18 at 232. 
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nationals be changed to reflect this fact.29  The Guatemalan authorities complied with this 
request on February 5, 1940.30   Frederich Nottebohm then resumed his business activities in 
Guatemala.31
Meanwhile, the Allied powers were becoming concerned about opening a “fifth column” 
for Nazi Germany in Latin America fueled by Germans living in Latin America, but remaining 
sympathetic to Germany.
 
32 The United States, in particular, worried about the prospect of Nazi 
sympathizers so close to home.  Thus, despite the fact that the U.S. had not yet officially entered 
the war, the Americans joined the British in taking measures to sever any financial assistance to 
Germany, including the blacklisting of companies and persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States who did business with Germany.33
As part of this effort, on November 1, 1939, England added Nottebohm Hermanos to a 
roster of blacklisted companies.
  The United States froze the assets of these 
firms and individuals so they could not provide any resources that might fuel the German war 
machine.   
34  In May 1941, the New York Times published an article which 
called a purchase of land in El Salvador by the Nottebohm Trading Company a “Nazi 
purchase.”35
                                                 
29 See Jones, supra, note 18 at 232. 
  On July 17, 1941, U.S. President Roosevelt issued a Proclamation creating a 
“Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals” consisting of “certain persons deemed to be, or 
to have been acting or purporting to act, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of or under the 
30 Nottebohm, supra note 2 at Annex No. 1 of Application to ICJ, p. 12; see also Jones, supra note 18 at 232.  
31 Jones, supra note 18 at 232. 
32 Max Paul Friedman, NAZIS AND GOOD NEIGHBORS: THE UNITED STATES CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GERMANS OF 
LATIN AMERICA IN WORLD WAR II 2, 52 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003).  The term ‘fifth column” derives from a 
comment by General Emilio Mola during the Spanish Civil War and refers to persons living within a community 
rising up to fight.  See id. at 2.  See also Fox, supra note 21 at 7-8. 
33 Presidential Proclamation 2497, 6 Fed. Reg. 3555 (July 19, 1941). 
34 82 Concerns Added to Trade Blacklist, NEW YORK TIMES 24 (Nov. 18, 1939). 
35 Questions Nazi Purchase, NEW YORK TIMES 31 (May 11, 1941). 
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direction of, . . . or in collaboration with Germany or Italy or a national thereof.”36   Nottebohm 
Trading Co. of Salvador, along with two Nottebohm companies in Guatemala, Nottebohm 
Hermanos and Nottebohm & Co., were included on that “Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked 
Nationals.”37
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States officially entered World 
War II in December 1941.
   
38  Guatemala also entered the war against Germany on December 11, 
1941.39  On December 8, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Orders pursuant to the 
Alien Enemy Act (AEA),40 declaring all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Germany who 
are over the age of 14 to be alien enemies and proscribing rules of conduct for such persons 
found within the jurisdiction of the United States.41
In 1942, the U.S. government added Frederich and his nephews and business partners, 
Karl-Heinz and Kurt Nottebohm, to the U.S. blacklist,
 
42 along with several more Nottebohm 
family businesses, including the Nottebohm Banking Corporation.43  Much of the Nottebohms’ 
collective property located in the United States was later deemed to be vested in the U.S. 
government, meaning that it could be held, used, administered, liquidated or sold for the benefit 
of the United States.44
In December 1942, both Karl-Heinz and Kurt Nottebohm were arrested in Guatemala as 
alien enemies despite the fact that they had been born in Guatemala and were Guatemalan 
 
                                                 
36 Presidential Proclamation Authorizing a Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals and Controlling Certain 
Exports, 6 Fed. Reg. 3555 (Jul. 19, 1941). 
37 6 Fed. Reg. 3555, 3568 (Jul. 19, 1941). 
38 Congressional Declaration of War on Japan, 55 Stat. pt. I, p. 795 (Dec. 8, 1941). 
39 See id.; see also Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at 7 (Guatemala entered war at end of 1941). 
40 50 U.S.C. § 21. 
41 Presidential Proclamation No. 2526 (Dec. 8, 1941). 
42 7 Fed. Reg. 2413, 2442 (Mar. 31, 1942) (Kurt); 7 Fed. Reg. 3275, 3295 (May 5, 1942) (Frederich and Karl 
Heinz). 
43 7 Fed. Reg. 837, 875 (Feb. 10, 1942); see also Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, supra note 12. 
44 See, e.g., 11 Fed. Reg. 3023, 3043 (Mar. 22, 1946); Vesting Order No. 10185, 13 Fed. Reg. 1, 13 (Jan. 1, 1948).  
However, as explained in more detail below, some property was eventually returned to the Nottebohm family. 
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citizens.45  In January 1943, U.S. military police in Guatemala City took them into custody and 
removed them to the United States.46  The U.S. government initially placed them in an 
internment camp called Camp Kenedy in Texas and later transferred them to Fort Lincoln in 
North Dakota.47
Some months later, on October 19, 1943, the Guatemalan police requested that Frederich 
Nottebohm appear before the Director of Police.
 
48  When he complied, he was informed that he 
and several other persons were to be deported to the United States and interned in a camp there.49  
Frederich protested that he was no longer a German citizen and showed the Guatemalan police 
his Liechtenstein passport.50  He was told that he would be deported regardless of his 
Liechtenstein nationality.51  The Swiss embassy, on behalf of Liechtenstein, also protested his 
deportation to and detention in the United States, but to no avail.52
                                                 
45 Petition for Habeas Corpus filed in U.S. ex rel. Kurt Nottebohm v. W. S. Cook (U.S. Dist Ct. ND, Dec. 20, 1945), 
Box 540, DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, “Nottebohm, Kurt,” RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD; Letter 
from Karl Heinz Nottebohm to Edward J. Ennis, Director, Alien Enemy Control Unit, dated May 5, 1944, Box 716, 
DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD; see also Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in 
Guatemala, supra note 12.  
  
46 Carl Wiegman, A Citizen Seeks to Free His Son Interned by U.S., CHICAGO DAILY TRIBUNE at 4 (Jan. 11, 1946). 
47See id. 
48 See Jones, supra note 18 at 232. Although this author uses the date of Nov. 19, he probably means Oct. 19, which 
is the date listed in U.S. government records.  See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS), Report of Alien Enemy, Nottebohm, Friedrich Wilhelm, Feb. 12, 1946, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special War 
Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder: “Nottebohm, 
Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.  See also Goldie, supra note 22, at 1269; Loewenfeld, 
supra note 19 at 7. 
49 See Jones, supra note 18 at 232. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 Letter from Robert Fischer, Swiss Consul, Consulate de Suisse, Guatemala, to the American Ambassador at the 
Embassy of the United States of America, Guatemala dated Oct. 20, 1943, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special War 
Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder: “Nottebohm, 
Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.  The U.S. government replied to the Swiss Consul’s 
inquiry in March 1944, stating that while it was aware that Frederich Nottebohm had attempted to change his 
nationality to that of Liechtenstein, it questioned the authenticity of his Liechtenstein citizenship.  U.S. Dept. of 
State Memorandum to the Swiss Legation, dated Mar. 28, 1944, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special War Problems Div., 
1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder: “Nottebohm, Frederico,” RG 59, 
National Archives, College Park, MD.  After further investigation, however, the U.S. government later came to the 
conclusion that Mr. Nottebohm’s adoption of Liechtenstein citizenship was bona fide.  Memorandum from J. 
Bingham, Chief, Alien Enemy Control Section, to Mr. Monsma, dated Jan. 10, 1946, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special 
 10 
Frederich Nottebohm was taken to a United States military camp in Guatemala City and, 
shortly thereafter, was placed on a U.S. ship and deported to the United States.53  He was 
interned at Camp Kenedy in Texas for approximately one year along with his nephews.54  In 
December 1943, all three of the Nottebohms at Camp Kenedy were given the opportunity to be 
repatriated to Germany, but they refused repatriation because they preferred to return to 
Guatemala.55
has engaged in no political activities detrimental to the best interests of the 
hemisphere, and that he cannot be considered a security subject for political 
reasons.  It appears that the only reason for keeping him in internment is the 
contention of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala and the U.S. State Department that 
his release would be detrimental to the economic policy of the United States in 
Central America.





Despite the board’s recommendations, Karl Nottebohm was not immediately released.  In 
September 1944, the U.S. government closed Camp Kenedy.57
                                                                                                                                                             
War Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder: 
“Nottebohm, Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
  As a result, the Nottebohms were 
53 See Jones, supra note 18 at 232. 
54 See id.  Interestingly, the Warrant from the U.S. Attorney General authorizing Federich Nottebohm’s detention as 
“a person [deemed] to be dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United Nations” was not issued until Nov. 
13, 1943, long after Mr. Nottebohm’s detention began.  See Warrant to the Commissioner of the INS issued by 
Francis Biddle, Attorney General and dated Nov. 13, 1943, Box 758, DOJ, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, 
MD (NA). 
55 Letter to W.F. Kelly, Ass’t Comm’r for Alien Control, INS, from I. Williams, Officer in Charge, Alien Internment 
Camp, Kenedy, TX, dated Dec. 23, 1943, Dept. of State, Special War Problems Div., RG 59, National Archives, 
College Park, MD.  The Nottebohms were luckier in this regard than Maher Arar, a dual Canadian and Syrian 
citizen who was arrested while transiting through New York in 2002 and removed to Syria for interrogation despite 
the fact that he claimed he would be tortured there.  Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 589 (2d Cir. 2009).  The Court 
dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under either the Torture Victims Protection Act or the Fifth 
Amendment and the Court refused to extend a Bivens action to a case of extraordinary rendition, in essence 
deferring to the political branches of government for reasons of foreign policy and national security.  See id. 
56 Alien Enemy Unit Recommendation, “Karl Nottebohm,” dated July 7, 1944, Box 716, DOJ Alien Enemy Case 
Files, “Nottebohm, Karl-Heinz,” RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD (NA). 
57 See German American Internee Coalition website:  USDOJ Internment Facilities (stating that Camp Kenedy 
closed in September 1944). 
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transferred to Fort Lincoln in North Dakota, where the Nottebohms remained until their release 
following the end of the war.58
In 1944, while the Nottebohms were detained in the United States, the government of 
Guatemala brought 57 sequestration hearings against Frederich Nottebohm as an enemy alien.
  
59  
On December 20, 1944, the Guatemalan Foreign Ministry cancelled his registration as a national 
of Liechtenstein.60
World War II came to an end in May 1945.
 
61  Karl-Heinz Nottebohm was released in 
December 1945 and allowed to return to Guatemala.62  The government of Guatemala also 
requested that the United States release Kurt Nottebohm.63  On January 10, 1946, U.S. District 
Court Judge Vogel ordered the U.S. government to release Kurt Nottebohm.64  The U.S. 
government complied, only to immediately charge Kurt Nottebohm with unlawful presence in 
the United States in violation of the immigration laws.65
After two years and three months in detention, the U.S. government released Frederich 
Nottebohm from Fort Lincoln in North Dakota on January 22, 1946.
  They gave him 90 days to return to 
Guatemala. 
66
                                                 
58 See Jones, supra note 18 at 233. 
  The government 
concluded that it had no credible evidence of Nazi sympathies or activities by Frederich 
59 Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at  7. Sequestration is the process by which the government takes into custody the 
property of a person until a legal matter is resolved.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1225 (5th ed. 1979). 
60 Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 19.   
61 Although Germany had been defeated and occupied since May 8, 1945, hostilities in World War II were not 
officially terminated until December 31, 1946.  See Presidential Proclamation No. 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. 1947 (Jan. 1, 
1947). 
62 Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, supra note 12 at 3. 
63 Carl Wiegman, supra note 46 at 4. 
64 See id.  
65 Id.; see also Edward J. Ennis, Director Alien Enemy Control Unit, Telegram to Honorable Powless W. Lanier, 
U.S. Attorney, dated Jan. 5, 1946, instructing Lanier to obtain release of Kurt Nottebohm, Box 540, DOJ Alien 
Enemy Case Files, “Nottebohm, Kurt,” RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD.   
66 Frederich Nottebohm was ordered released on January 15, 1946.  See Letter from Jonathan B. Bingham, Chief, 
Alien Enemy Control Section, to Ugo Carusi, Comm’r of INS, dated Jan. 15, 1946, Box 44, Dept. of State, Special 
War Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), Folder: 
“Nottebohm, Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.   
 12 
Nottebohm.  A December 1945 Memorandum from the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala states that 
“Nottebohm’s name does not appear on the Nazi party list believed to be authentic, and there is 
no reliable evidence to indicate that he was a member of the party or even a sympathizer of 
Hitler.”67 The U.S. government’s main evidence against Frederich Nottebohm was a purported 
copy of a letter allegedly written by him that expressed a desire to “fight for the greatness of 
Germany and its cause.”68  For a variety of reasons, the U.S. government expressed “grave 
doubt” as to the authenticity of the letter.69
Upon his release, Frederich traveled to New Orleans and applied for permission to return 
to Guatemala.  Guatemala refused to readmit him.
  Accordingly, the U.S. government ultimately 
recommended and arranged for his release. 
70  Frederich appealed the Guatemalan Foreign 
Ministry’s decision to cancel his registration as a citizen of Liechtenstein, but was 
unsuccessful.71
In 1949, Guatemala passed Decree Law No. 689 which retrospectively fixed the date of 
October 7, 1938 as the date on which enemy alien status should be determined.
  Since he could not return to Guatemala, Frederich traveled to Liechtenstein and 
made his home there instead. 
72
                                                 
67 See U.S. Embassy at Guatemala, Memorandum on Frederico Nottebohm dated Dec. 6, 1945, Box 44, Dept. of 
State, Special War Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), 
Folder: “Nottebohm, Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.   
  In other words, 
a person’s nationality as of October 1938 would remain that person’s nationality throughout 
World War II regardless of any actions to change it.  Because Frederich Nottebohm was still a 
German national on that date, his attempt to change his nationality to that of Liechtenstein in 
68 Confidential Memorandum, “Federico Weber Nottebohm (Guatemala),” dated Jan. 10, 1946, Box 44, Dept. of 
State, Special War Problems Div., 1939-54: Name Files of Interned Enemy Aliens from Latin Am. (1942-48), 
Folder: “Nottebohm, Frederico,” RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
69 See id.  It was surmised that the fake letter was prepared to support the Guatemalan government’s decision to 
expropriate Frederich Nottebohm’s property. 
70 Jones, supra note 18 at 233. 
71 See id. 
72 Goldie, supra note 22 at 1271.  Guatemala’s actions were consistent with the goals of the Committee for Political 
Defense, which was concerned about abuse of nationality laws by suspected German spies.  See Part III below. 
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1939 was invalid in the view of the Guatemalan government and he was still considered a 
German national.  Accordingly, the Guatemalan government took the official position that it was 
entitled to expropriate all of Frederich Nottebohm’s property in Guatemala without 
compensation because he was an enemy alien.73
In April 1950, Nottebohm Hermanos commenced a civil action against the United States 
government seeking return of its property that had been frozen in the United States during 
WWII. 
 
74  In that lawsuit, the U.S. government asserted that German interests existed in 
Nottebohm Hermanos during the World Wars contrary to the claims of the Nottebohm family.75  
The U.S. government claimed Johannes Nottebohm, a citizen and resident of Germany, was also 
a partner, as well as Nottebohm & Co., a firm in Hamburg Germany, and that the Nottebohms 
had misrepresented these facts to the U.S. government following World War I in an attempt to 
persuade the government to unblock property seized during that war.76
The Nottebohms and the U.S. government began a series of negotiations that resulted in 
an agreement to unblock the Nottebohm’s assets.  Pursuant to a Release Agreement dated 
December 21, 1950, the U.S. government entered into a settlement with the Nottebohms and 
released the claims of the United States against them.
  Because of these alleged 
misrepresentations, the U.S. government claimed it was entitled to keep the Nottebohm’s 
property seized during WWII. 
77
                                                 
73 See Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at 7. 
  The anticipated settlement would 
provide an amount of money that represented approximately half the value of Nottebohm 
74 Nottebohm Hermanos v. McGrath, Complaint dated Apr. 4, 1950, Civ. Action No. 1509-50 (D.D.C.) 
75 Peyton Ford, Asst. to the Attorney General, Findings and Decision on the Record and Hearings Concerning 
Nottebohm Hermanos, Et Al., (Dec. 29, 1949), Thomas Corcoran Papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. 
76 Answer and Counterclaim in Civil Action No. 1509-50, Thomas Corcoran Papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
77 Release dated Dec. 21, 1950, signed by Harold Baynton, Assistant Attorney General, Director of Office of Alien 
Property and several of the Nottebohms, Thomas Corcoran Papers, Box 505, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.  
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Hermanos’ property that had been seized.  However, much of the property was not actually 
released until 1958.78
Frederich Nottebohm also persuaded the Liechtenstein government to take up his quest to 
return to Guatemala and reclaim his property.  On December 17, 1951, Liechtenstein filed an 
application against Guatemala with the International Court of Justice alleging that Guatemala 
had wrongfully refused to recognize its grant of citizenship to Frederich Nottebohm.
 
79  
Unfortunately for Nottebohm, the ICJ ruled that he did not have sufficient genuine links with 
Liechtenstein such that Guatemala had to honor the Liechtenstein grant of citizenship.80  This 
decision was highly criticized by international scholars81 and its reasoning was later rejected by 
the International Law Commission in its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection.82
Following the ICJ’s decision, the Guatemalan Congress voted on November 23, 1956 to 
expropriate all German property without compensation.
 
83  The Guatemalan government, led by 
Carlos Castillo Armas, determined that virtually all German property confiscated during World 
War II would be registered permanently as state property to pay for Guatemala’s “war 
damages.”84  As a result, Frederich Nottebohm was stripped of all of his property in Guatemala 
and received no compensation for his loss.85
                                                 
78 See Department of Justice Office of Alien Property – Notice of Intention to Return Vested Property, 23 Fed. Reg. 
9169, 9204 (Nov. 27, 1958) (listing the property of several members of the Nottebohm family including Frederich 
(Liechtenstein), Karl-Heinz, Carmen and Erika (Guatemala), and Kurt (El Salvador).  Frederich’s claim was later 
amended.  See 24 Fed. Reg. 9303, 9325 (Nov. 18, 1959). 
   
79 Nottebohm, supra note 2 at 12. 
80 Nottebohm, supra note 2 at 26.  The Court announced its judgment in April 1955.  Mr. Nottebohm died the 
following year at the age of 75 in Hamburg, Germany on January 26, 1956.  Email from Hansjoerg Meier, Director 
Civil Registry Office of Liechtenstein, September 12, 2008. 
81 See Goldie, supra note 22 at 1272; Jones, supra note 18 at 231; Loewenfeld, supra note 19 at 5. 
82 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with Commentaries 32-33 (2006), 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_8_2006.pdf. 
83 See Bonn Bars Ties with Guatemala, NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE (Dec, 4, 1956).  This action led to the 
December 1956 refusal of West Germany to establish diplomatic relations with Guatemala.  See id. 
84 ‘End of War’ Act Aids Guatemala, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 25, 1956). 
85 Although Frederich Nottebohm was not compensated, the Guatemalan government did return 16 of the fincas 
(coffee plantations) to the Nottebohm family after his death in 1962.  Friedman, supra note 32 at 187. 
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II. A Tragedy of Justice: The Creation of the Latin American Detention Program 
Frederich Nottebohm was arrested, forcibly removed to the United States, interned for 
over two years, and stripped of his Guatemalan property (as well as some of his assets in the 
U.S.), without due process of law. The U.S. government never held a hearing at which Frederich 
was proved to be a German citizen or a threat to the national security of the United States.  U.S. 
law at the time authorized the President to apprehend and restrain persons found in the United 
States who are natives or citizens of a hostile nation during war time.86  The law did not require 
any showing of dangerousness in word or deed.  Simply being a national or citizen of an enemy 
country by accident of birth or family was sufficient.  As one Immigration and Nationalization 
Service (“INS”) official involved in the program stated, “the war thrust us into the shameful 
position of locking people up for their beliefs.”87
Unfortunately, Nottebohm’s story is not unique.  Over 4,000 persons of German 




                                                 
86 50 U.S.C. § 21.  Of course, the AEA does not address the legality of the U.S.’ involvement in the arrest and 
forcible transfer of persons to the U.S., which was necessary to establish jurisdiction over the Nottebohms.  And 
U.S. courts were reluctant to question the actions of foreign governments in this regard.  In a case involving a 
German citizen arrested in Costa Rica and brought to the United States for internment, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit invoked the Act of State Doctrine in response to Von Heymann’s challenge to the lawfulness of 
his arrest and removal to the United States, holding that it could not review “the legality of governmental acts 
performed by a foreign sovereign within its own territory.”  U.S. ex rel. Von Heymann v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 650, 
652 (2d Cir. 1947), citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,252-53 (1897). 
  For example, in the Panama Canal Zone, the Panamanian government and U.S. military 
officials routinely cooperated to intern Axis nationals “without any inquiry as to the loyalty or 
87 Arnold Krammer, UNDUE PROCESS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S GERMAN ALIEN INTERNEES 129 (1997) 
(quoting Jerre Mangione, INS camp inspector).   
88 Friedman, supra note 32, at 2; Fox, supra note 21 at 89.  “The United States interned more persons from 
Guatemala than from any other republic except Peru.” Stephen Fox, THE DEPORTATION OF LATIN AMERICAN 
GERMANS, 1941-47: FRESH LEGS FOR MR. MONROE’S DOCTRINE, 32 Y.B. GER.-AM. STUD. 17, 123 (1997). The 
treatment of Japanese from Peru was consistent with the treatment of Germans from Latin America.  See Natsu 
Taylor Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law in the World War II Internment of 
Japanese Peruvians – A Case Study, 40 Boston College L. Rev. 275 (1998). 
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danger of the particular alien.”89  According to historian Max Friedman, “only a minority of the 
deportees conceivably warranted the label of “dangerous enemy alien.”90  “With only eight of the 
4,058 German deportees even allegedly involved in espionage, and the record of sabotage 
“practically nil” according to the FBI, spying and sabotage were red herrings as far as the 
internments were concerned.”91
The historical record reveals three quite different reasons for the United States’ 
development and operation of the Latin American Detention Program during WWII. The first 
justification provided for the Program was national security.  As noted above, the United States 
was concerned about the possibility of German subversives operating in its own backyard and 
was not confident that the Latin American governments were able or willing to sufficiently 
contain this threat.
  Thus, the counterespionage work of Allied intelligence did not 
result in a high positive rate of identification and internment of truly dangerous enemy aliens. 
92 Second, the United States wanted to build up a reserve of German internees 
who could be traded for American prisoners of war.93 Third, the United States hoped to eliminate 
German commercial interests in Latin America in part to make room for U.S. business interests 
to move in after the war.94
Historian Max Friedman explains the United States’ motivation to create the program as 
follows: “The U.S. view[ed] Latin America as a vulnerable, dependent region where latinos [sic] 
  Whether or not a person posed any security risk to the United States 
was largely irrelevant to these latter two goals. 
                                                 
89Friedman, supra note 32 at 111. 
90 Id. at 6. 
91 Id.at 9, citing Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), German Espionage in Latin America, June 1946, 
862.20210/6-1746, RG 59, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
92 Fox, supra note 88 at 119 (“In Washington in late 1938 officials believed that by themselves the republics would 
or could not resist the combined political, economic, and military threat from Germany.”). 
93 Krammer, supra note 87 at 91. 
94 Id. at 92; see also Fox, supra note 21 at 89 (“The United States did not remove the Germans from Latin America 
primarily for reasons of national security, which was the official explanation.  Rather, the deportation program was a 
disingenuous plan . . . to replace German economic interests in the region with those of the United States and 
cooperative republics.”); see also Fox, supra note 88 at 123 (“The FBI later bragged (discreetly omitting the key 
role played by the United States) that the actions of the Guatemalan government  after 1941 had ‘rid the Republic of 
the extensive commercial, economic, and financial control exercised by German nationals.’”). 
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are helpless and foreigners are the real actors.”95  The United States believed that the quality of 
the intelligence operation that was supposed to find subversives to the south was poor; thus, it 
could not accurately assess the extent of the threat or the ability of the Latin American 
governments to deal with it.96  Further, “Germans living in Latin America . . . were making 
inroads into Latin American markets. . . .  As with the fear of military invasion, U.S. officials 
believed the German economic offensive depended on the collaboration of Germans residing in 
Latin America. . . .  German competition was a security issue.”97
The removal of Latin America’s Germans evolved rapidly out of three related 
currents of policy.  The first was the endeavor by the U.S. government to identify 
and neutralize dangerous Axis nationals in Latin America. . . .  U.S. officials had 
no confidence that Latin American governments were able to discipline their own 
Axis nationals and believed that local internment would be inadequate.  
Dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of local controls would provide a rationale 
for transferring the aliens to United States custody.  The second current flowed 
from the desire of the United States to destroy German power and of some of the 
Latin American leaders to turn the anti-Axis campaign into political or financial 
gain. . . .  The third current emanated from a traditional wartime practice under 
which belligerents agree to repatriate enemy diplomats and bring their own 
diplomats home.
  Friedman summarizes the 




Each of these three motivations is explained in more detail below.  
A.  National Security 
Immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the U.S. 
Ambassador to Panama, Edward Wilson, became concerned that the Panama Canal might be the 
object of a similar attack.99
                                                 
95 Friedman, supra note 32 at 4. 
  Accordingly, the United States requested that Panama detain and 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 4. 
98 Id. at 105. 
99 See id. at 108. 
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intern enemy aliens within Panama.100 The United States effectuated similar roundups in several 
other Latin American countries, including Guatemala.101  President Ubico of Guatemala asked 
the U.S. Legation if it would assist him in expelling all Nazis of military age from his country, 
which the United States did.102
The Roosevelt Administration perceived a possibility of Germans living in Latin America 
becoming a destabilizing force and presenting a “fifth column” for Nazi Germany.
  
103  “[T]he 
Roosevelt administration assumed Hitler might use the Auslandsdeutsche (Germans living 
abroad) to pave the way for a German invasion of the Americas.”104
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle “was the main force behind the [Latin 
American] deportation program.”
 
105  He supported the program primarily because he viewed 
Germans in Latin America as an external threat to the United States.106   However, actual proof 
of subversive activities was not required.  A U.S. State Department memorandum from 
November 1942 insisted that it was not necessary to distinguish between dangerous and non-
dangerous enemy aliens because their national identity alone was sufficient evidence of their 
collective guilt.107
Both Guatemala and the United States “misconstrued expressions of group solidarity and 




                                                 
100 See id. 
  In 1941, it was conventional wisdom that “Germans living in Latin 
101 See id. 
102 See id. Approximately 10% of Germans in Guatemala belonged to the Nazi party.  See id. at 27. 
103 See id. at 2, 52-55; see also Fox, supra note 21 at 8. 
104 Friedman, supra note 32 at 45. 
105 See id. at 81. 
106 See id. 
107 “Memorandum regarding activities of the United States Government in removing from the other American 
Republics dangerous subversive aliens” 2 (Nov. 3 1942), Subject Files 1939–54, Box 180, Special War Problems 
Division, RG59, National Archives, College Park, MD; see also Friedman, supra note 32 at 119. 
108 Friedman, supra note 32 at 5. 
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America [were] the key to Nazi aspirations for dominating the region by military, political, or 
economic means.”109  In 1942, the U.S. State Department declared that in Latin America, “all 
German nationals without exception. . . are all dangerous and should be removed from their 
present sphere of activity as rapidly as possible.”110
Many U.S. officials, including intelligence agents, ambassadors, and cabinet members, 
failed to understand Latin America and Latin Americans; they failed to speak the language and 
held many stereotypes and prejudices.
 
111  The media depicted Latin Americans as “inferior and 
childlike, feminized and vulnerable.”112  Yellow journalism “contributed directly to the 
impressions held by policymakers in Washington.”113  The British also contributed to the 
misinformation regarding the Nazi menace in Latin America in order to persuade the U.S. 
government of the urgency of the threat posed by Germany and to try to bring the United States 
into the war.114
In retrospect, however, there was little solid evidence that many of these individuals 
presented any real danger.
 
115  Postwar reports often lacked charges or reasons as to why certain 
individuals had been rounded up.116  In fact, some of those arrested and interned were Jews who 
had themselves fled from the Nazis.117
The contention that all Germans were dangerous is refuted by the United States’ own 
experience with the more than 300,000 Germans living within its own borders and its decision to 
 
                                                 
109Id.; Krammer, supra note 87 at 36 (the FBI is “now considered by historians to have been notoriously 
irresponsible and biased at the time of WWII.”). 
110 “Memorandum regarding activities of the United States Government in removing from the other American 
Republics dangerous subversive aliens,” supra note 107 at 2. 
111 Friedman, supra note 32 at 48-49; Krammer, supra note 87 at 36. 
112  Friedman, supra note 32 at 49. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 58; Krammer, supra note 87 at 89. 
115 Friedman, supra note 32 at 110; Krammer, supra note 87 at 89. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
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intern less than 1% of them.118
B. Bargaining Chips 
  If Germans were dangerous by virtue of their nationality alone, it 
would have made more sense to detain those already living in the United States in far greater 
numbers than to import Germans from Latin America for detention. 
A second reason the U.S. government brought Germans from Latin America to the 
United States for detention was a concern for American prisoners of war in Germany.  Having 
Germans in custody opened the door for the possibility of prisoner exchanges and the 
repatriation of American POWs.119
On December 16, 1941, John Moores Cabot, the Central America desk officer in the 
State Department summed up the arguments in favor of a regional program to intern Germans in 
the United States as follows: 
  In addition, it was hoped that Germans would treat 
American prisoners of war better if they knew that whatever treatment they provided would be 
reciprocated by the United States with respect to Germans in U.S. custody. 
“I feel that it is wise to clear as many young Nazis out of Central America as 
possible, because (1) it will definitely diminish the danger of subversive activities 
in Central America and the indirect threat they represent to the Canal, (2) it will 
give us hostages who will serve as a brake on any measures taken against our 
citizens in enemy-occupied territory, (3) it will please the governments of 
countries which are anxious to get rid of the Axis nationals, and it will be 
considered by them an act of practical cooperation, (4) it may serve as an 
inspiration for other countries which seriously fear subversive activities, (5) it will 
build up a vested interest in Germany’s defeat in the countries concerned, 
particularly if any property is seized, . . . While I do not think we should urge any 
government to deport Axis nationals, I see no harm in discreetly pushing the 
matter when an opening is given.”120
 
  
                                                 
118 Friedman, supra note 32 at 3, 111, 120;  Krammer, supra note 87 at 173. 
119 Krammer, supra note 87 at 91.  Some obstacles to this plan, including a lack of ships for transportation, are 
described in Fox, supra note 88 at 126-9. 
120 Friedman, supra note 32 at 109 (quoting Memorandum from Cabot to Philip Bonsal, U.S. Dept. of State, dated 
Dec. 6, 1941). Cabot appears to equate “young Nazis” with Axis nationals, reflecting the view that all Germans were 
dangerous.  However, Cabot later protested the excesses of the program.  See id. 
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Thus, German citizens could be used as bargaining chips both to obtain the release of American 
POWs and to secure their decent treatment while in German captivity. 
C. Commercial Gains 
  What began as a deportation program driven by national security concerns evolved over time 
“to focus increasingly upon individuals who could in no way be tied to Nazi activity, but had 
acquired significant economic positions.”121  It appears that economic issues gradually replaced 
security concerns near the midpoint of the deportation program.  The United States was very 
interested in post-war U.S. dominance in Latin American markets, which is demonstrated by 
U.S. reluctance to return German detainees to Latin America following the war.122  Instead, some 
U.S. officials advocated for repatriation to Germany for the sake of “our long-range economic 
and political interests.”123
Reactions from the Latin American countries were mixed.  Some requested that the many 
detainees with family members in Latin America be returned home and reunited with their 
families.
   
124  Other Latin American leaders realized that “seizing the property of their German 
neighbors could be greatly simplified by calling them Nazis and handing them over to the United 
States” and not allowing them to return.125
The targeting of the Nottebohms for economic rather than political activities “vividly 
illustrates the way the deportation program had evolved during the war from an undertaking 
primarily motivated by the need to ensure security against subversion into a long-term project of 
permanently weakening German economic competition in a region long claimed as ‘America’s 
  
                                                 
121 Friedman, supra note 32 at 4-5. 
122 See id. at 4-5; see also Krammer, supra note 87 at 92, 152; Fox, supra note 88 at 130-4. 
123 Id. at 131.  See also Saito, supra note 88 at 298 (discussing same phenomenon with respect to Japanese from 
Peru). 
124 See id. at 132-3. 
125 Friedman, supra note 32 at 6. 
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backyard.’”126  Thus, while the United States was initially concerned with national security, 
economic concerns eventually became paramount.  By way of example, in 1943, Albert 
Clattenburg, Assistant Chief of Breckinridge Long’s Special Division, completed a report after 
touring several U.S. internment camps, in which he discussed the original purpose of the 
program: “Our transfer of these enemy aliens to this country for internment is based on our 
sincere desire to extirpate the carefully-prepared organizations of the Axis governments in the 
other American republics and thus to ensure the political security of this hemisphere.”127  He 
then concluded, however, that the program was corrupted by Latin American leaders who 
wanted to get rid of persons who were likely to foment internal opposition or in order to seize the 
business and property of the deported Axis nationals.128
With respect to the Nottebohm family in particular, there is evidence in the files of the 
State Department on Karl and Kurt Nottebohm that these individuals were deemed not to be 
dangerous and that their removal from Guatemala was largely motivated by economic concerns.  
For example, one Department of Justice memorandum concerning the Nottebohm family 
acknowledges that there was no evidence they had been engaged in any political activities and 
that there was even some evidence that they were “actually anti-Nazi.”
  
129  The memorandum’s 
author, James Bell, further wrote that he did not support continued internment of the Nottebohms 
“because I believe that the economic end, the breaking up of economic power of certain Germans 
in Central America, has been served by the deportations of the subjects from Central 
America.”130
                                                 
126 Id. at 168. 
  Likewise, Kurt Nottebohm alleged in a petition for habeas corpus for release from 
127 Id. at 221.   
128 See id. 
129 James D. Bell, Memorandum to the Chief of the Review Section on the “Nottebohm Family” dated Aug. 12, 




detention that when he inquired of the U.S. government as to why he was being detained, he was 
told: “We have investigated your record and found nothing against you, but you must realize this 
is also a commercial war.”131
D. Expressions of Concern 
  Thus, Karl and Kurt Nottebohm, both Guatemalan citizens, and 
Frederich, a Liechtenstein citizen, appear to have been detained for economic reasons far more 
than because of any security issues. 
Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Breckinridge Long was the most senior official at the 
U.S. State Department in charge of overseeing the deportation and repatriation of Germans from 
Latin America.132  “He and his like-minded subordinates in the Special Division helped bring 
Jews and other non-Nazis into the camps and ensured that they would not receive hearings or be 
otherwise enabled to argue their case” for release.133  The State Department was not in charge of 
the camps, however.  That duty fell to the Department of Justice (DOJ).134
The DOJ lawyers made a greater attempt to discriminate between dangerous and non-
dangerous Germans than did the State Department officials.  The person in charge on the Justice 
side was Edward Eniss, the head of DOJ’s Alien Enemy Control Unit (AECU).
  
135  He opposed 
mass internment on principle, and with U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle’s support, he tried 
to moderate the excesses of the program.136
                                                 
131 Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by George Dix in U.S. ex rel. Kurt Nottebohm v. W. S. Cook (U.S. Dist Ct. ND, 
Dec. 20, 1945), Box 540, DOJ Alien Enemy Case Files, “Nottebohm, Kurt,” RG 60, National Archives, College 
Park, MD. 
  “Ennis found a sympathetic listener in James H. 
Keeley, Jr., the acting chief of the State Department’s Special Division, who was beginning to 
have some qualms of his own.  Keeley had noted that enemy aliens in the United States received 
132 Friedman, supra note 32 at 156. 
133 See id. at 157. 
134 See id. at 158.  See also Fox, supra note 21 at 9. 
135 See Friedman, supra note 32 at 158.  The Alien Enemy Control Unit was a new division created within the 
Department of Justice to supervise alien enemies.  Charles W. Harris, The Alien Enemy Hearing Board as a Judicial 
Device in the United States During World War II, 14 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1360, 1362, at n. 12 (1965). 
136 See Friedman, supra note 32 at 159; see also Fox, supra note 21 at 91, 131. 
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hearings, but those the State Department brought up from Latin America did not.”137
Whether the man be innocent or guilty of subversive activities inimical to the 
safety of this hemisphere, it seems to me that he is entitled to have his case 
reviewed somewhere, [s]omehow. . .The aliens received from other American 
Republics have had scant, if any, hearings in the Republic from whence they 
came, and . . .they are apparently condemned to remain interned here for the 
duration of the war without the possibility of having the facts in their cases 
reviewed here or in the Republic from whence they came.  I don’t like it . . . It 
isn’t in keeping with the principles of justice for which we are fighting.  No one 
wants to be soft as regards to a dangerous enemy alien, but we need not copy the 
methods of our enemies by refusing to permit a man who claims to be innocent 
somehow to arrange for a hearing of his case on the merits. . . To give such aliens 
a hearing, or a rehearing in those cases where the semblance of a hearing may 
have been given in the Republic that sent them here, should not endanger the 
safety of the United States.
  Keeley 




Keeley’s efforts to provide hearings were rebuffed by his State Department colleague, 
Breckinridge Long, however.139
III. Was the Program Legal? 
  But despite State’s resistance, many of the detainees did receive 
administrative hearings, as described below. 
A. United States Law 
U.S. law at the time of World War II authorized the President during war time to 
apprehend and restrain persons found in the United States who are natives or citizens of a hostile 
nation.140
Whenever there is declared war between the United States and any foreign nation 
or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, 
or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or 
government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event, all 
  The primary statutory authority relied upon by the United States in conducting the 
Latin American Detention Program was the Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21, which provides: 
                                                 
137 Friedman, supra note 32 at 160. 
138 See James H. Keeley, Jr. to Miss Moore dated 12 November 1942, Alien Enemy Case Files, Nottebohm, 
Federico Wilhelm, Box 758, DOJ, RG60, National Archives, College Park, MD (NA). 
139 Friedman, supra note 32 at 160.   
140 50 U.S.C. § 21. 
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natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being 
of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States 
and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, 
and removed as alien enemies.  The President is authorized, in any such event, by 
his proclamation thereof, or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed, 
on the part of the United States, toward the aliens who become so liable; the 
manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject and in what 
cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide 
for the removal of those who, not being permitted to reside within the United 
States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations 
which are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety.141
 
  
The Alien Enemy Act was originally passed in 1798 and has changed little since then.142   
Pursuant to this statutory authority, the President is given extremely broad discretion to arrest, 
detain and remove “natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects” of a hostile nation found in the 
United States.143
The AEA was implemented with respect to persons from Latin America by way of a 
series of Executive Orders.  Execution of the program was assigned to a new governmental unit 
called the AECU, in the DOJ.
   The purpose of the Act is to subject to Executive control all aliens, who, 
because of their nativity or feeling of allegiance, might be led to acts dangerous to the public 
safety of the United States if permitted to remain at large.   
144  The head of the DOJ, Attorney General Francis Biddle, 
emphasized the need to conduct the program of investigation into enemy aliens as fairly as 
possible, consistent with democratic principles.145  To that end, civilian alien enemy review 
boards were created to examine the evidence against an alien enemy and determine his or her 
fate.146
                                                 
141 Id. 
  
142 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 162 (1948). 
143 50 U.S.C. § 21. The statute requires that the persons be found within the United States; hence, the need to bring 
the persons from Latin America to the United States for internment. 
144 Fox, supra note 88 at 133. 
145 Harris, supra note 136 at 1362. 
146 Krammer, supra note 87 at 45. 
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Accused alien enemies had no right to a hearing before the Board,147 but many hearings 
were granted to allow an alien to present evidence on his or her behalf.  A board was composed 
of three or more persons who were usually prominent citizens in the community.148  There was 
no requirement that hearing board officers be lawyers or judges; although an attempt was made 
to have at least one attorney on each Board.149
Accused persons had no right to counsel, but could bring a friend along as an advisor.
     
150   
By contrast, the government was represented by the United States District Attorney for that 
particular judicial district (or his designee), along with a special agent from the FBI, and a 
representative from the INS.151
The FBI conducted the investigation of the alien and presented its evidence to the 
Board.
   
152  The alien would be questioned about the evidence and could submit affidavits in his or 
her behalf.153  Aliens could bring only limited challenges to their detention, such as alleging that 
they were not, in fact, of German nationality or were less than the statutory minimum of 14 years 
of age.154
The Board was empowered to recommend one of three outcomes: internment, parole, or 
release.
 
155  The Board’s recommendation was forwarded to the AECU, where it was reviewed, 
and forwarded to the Attorney General with a recommendation of the directors of the AECU.156
                                                 
147 Harris, supra note 136 at 1362. 
  
148 Id.; Krammer, supra note 87 at 45. 
149 Harris, supra note 136 at 1363. 
150 Id. Although technically allowed to bring a friend or relative to attest to character or loyalty, some aliens claimed 




154 See, e.g., Ex Parte Gilroy, 257 F. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (holding that person born in Germany to naturalized U.S. 
citizen father is U.S. citizen and not enemy alien); Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290, 294 (C.A.D.C. 
1946); Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 171, n. 17 (willingness to review whether a person is 14 years of age). 
155 Harris, supra note 136 at 1363; Krammer, supra note 87 at 47. 
156 Harris, supra note 136 at 1363; see also Krammer, supra note 87 at 46. 
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The U.S. District Attorney would also make his own independent recommendation.157  If the 
three recommendations were in agreement, the Attorney Generally normally concurred in their 
recommendations.158  If there was disagreement, the Attorney General tended to side with the 
Board, which had actually observed the demeanor of the accused alien enemy.159
One scholar who studied these Alien Enemy Review Boards concluded that: 
  
While admittedly, the United States Constitution offers no protection to an enemy 
alien during the time of war, the position of the United States Government during 
World War II was that it did not want to sacrifice the substance of democracy 
while men battled in foreign lands to preserve it.  The procedural aspects of its 
internment programme were designed to support this principle.160
   
 
However, this scholar went on to describe the United States’ use of these review boards 
as a “feeble gesture.”161  They were informal tribunals with little or no applicable law to guide 
them.  If the U.S. government thought a Board member was too lenient in favor of aliens, the 
Justice Department would remove the officer from the Board.162 Accordingly, the boards were 
forced to create and apply their own rules, acting as both judge and jury.163
The constitutionality of the Alien Enemy Act was challenged in a number of lawsuits, 
including Ludecke v. Watkins, a post-World War II suit that reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
 
164  
The plaintiff, Mr. Ludecke, had been born in Germany and had once been a member of the Nazi 
party.165  However, he later disagreed with the Nazis and was imprisoned in a German 
concentration camp.166
                                                 
157 Harris, supra note 136 at 1363. 
  He escaped in 1934 and traveled to the United States, where he became a 
158 Id. at 1368. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 1369. 
161 Id. at 1370. 
162 Krammer, supra note 87 at 47. 
163 Harris, supra note 136 at 1370. 
164 Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 160. 
165 Id. at 163. 
166 Id. 
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lawful permanent resident.167  His petition to become a U.S. citizen was denied in 1939, 
however, and, in 1941, he was arrested as an alien enemy whom the Attorney General deemed to 
be dangerous to the United States.168
By the time Mr. Ludecke’s case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, World War II had been 
over for three years.  Mr. Ludecke claimed that the statute did not authorize deportation of 
enemy aliens after hostilities had ceased.  In addition, Mr. Ludecke claimed that due process 
required that the federal courts review the fairness of the administrative hearing at which he was 
determined to be a dangerous enemy alien. 
  After unsuccessfully challenging his removal to Germany 
in administrative hearings, Mr. Ludecke brought a habeas corpus petition in federal court 
alleging that the Alien Enemy Act was unconstitutional. 
 In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, stating 
that, barring questions of interpretation and constitutionality, the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 is a 
statute that precludes judicial review.169  The Act “confers on the president very great 
discretionary powers” and “the very nature of the President’s power to order the removal of all 
enemy aliens rejects the notion that courts may pass judgment upon the exercise of his 
discretion.”170  Thus, the Court accepted a very narrow role for judicial review.171
                                                 
167 Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 163, 173. 
   
168 Id. at 163. 
169 Id. at 163-64. 
170 Id. at 164.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit likewise stated: “Unreviewable power 
in the President to restrain, and to provide for the removal of, alien enemies in time of war is the essence of the Act.”  
Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290, 294 (C.A.D.C. 1946).  The court further reasoned that a nation 
must have the power to remove enemies during war who are actually hostile or merely potentially so because of 
their allegiance to a foreign government.  See id.  And the government should not have to reveal confidential 
information about enemy activity with our borders in a judicial proceeding reviewing that action.  Id. 
171 The courts have been willing to review whether a person is a native, citizen, denizen or subject of a hostile nation 
within the meaning of the Act, see, e.g., Ex Parte Gilroy, 257 F. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (holding that person born in 
Germany to naturalized U.S. citizen father is U.S. citizen and not enemy alien); Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 
155 F.2d 290, 294 (C.A.D.C. 1946), and whether a person is 14 years of age, see, e.g., Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 171, n. 
17.  See also U.S. v. Schwarzkopf, 137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943) (finding accused alien enemy is citizen of Austria 
rather than Germany); U.S. v. Steinvorth, 159 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1947) (finding that when Costa Rica cancelled 
Steinvorth’s citizenship, his former German citizenship was not restored.). 
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On the merits, the Court held that “[w]ar does not cease with a cease-fire order, and 
power to be exercised by the President such as that conferred by the Act of 1798 is a process 
which begins when war is declared but is not exhausted when the shooting stops.”172  The Court 
further noted that it is often impracticable to deport an alien enemy during active hostilities.173
As is evident from its text, the AEA does not require any showing of disloyalty in word 
or deed.  Simply being a native or citizen of an enemy country by accident of birth is 
sufficient.
  
Thus, the power to deport alien enemies continues beyond the end of the “declared war.”  
174  Interestingly, in Ludecke, the Supreme Court noted the fact that the statute did not 
require a showing of dangerousness, but also noted that this potential deficiency was cured by 
the President’s Proclamation requiring that only enemy aliens deemed dangerous by the Attorney 
General shall be removed.175  The Court assumed that the President and the Attorney General 
would not act arbitrarily, but would imply a standard such as “dangerousness” in the exercise of 
this power.176  This assumption leaves open the question of the statute’s constitutionality if a 
person is arrested, detained, and removed merely on the basis of nationality without any showing 
of dangerousness.177
Outside the wartime context, such treatment likely would be considered unlawful 
discrimination based on race or nationality and a violation of due process.  The Court spent little 
time on the issue of any potential violation of Ludecke’s individual rights, however, simply 
 
                                                 
172 Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 167. 
173 Id. at 166. 
174 See U.S. ex rel. Umecker v. McCoy, 54 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D.N.D. 1944) (“Nativity is determined solely by place 
of birth, not by allegiance, citizenship or duty. . . a person is a native of the place of birth and always remains a 
native of that place, regardless of anything he may do.”) 
175 Id. at 165. 
176 Id. at 166.  Resolution XX of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 
discussed below recommends the internment of dangerous enemy aliens, which may be the basis for the inclusion of 
this language in the President’s Proclamation. 
177 Other attempts to challenge this assumption of disloyalty also were largely unsuccessful.  See e.g., Minotto v. 
Bradley, 252 F. 600 (N.D. Ill. 1918).  
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declaring that the Act is not “offensive to some emanation of the Bill of Rights” including the 
Due Process Clause.178  The Court stated that if war powers are abused, recourse should be 
sought in the political branches, not in court.179
The Ludecke decision was a close one with four justices dissenting, both as to the 
continuing application of the Act beyond the cessation of active hostilities and as to the ability of 
the court to review the fairness of the administrative procedures to ensure due process.
 
180  
According to Justice Douglas, the procedures used to find Ludecke a danger to the public “must 
conform with the requirements of due process.  And habeas corpus is the time-honored 
procedure to put them to the test. . . .  Due process does not perish when war comes.”181
The Court’s decision in Ludecke is consistent with its historical reluctance to question the 
political branches of government in time of war.  It also is consistent with the treatment of 
foreign nationals in U.S. immigration law.
  
Unfortunately for Ludecke and the other German detainees, however, his was not the winning 
argument.   
182  As a general rule, U.S. courts have declared that 
the federal government has plenary power over immigration, in part because of its connection to 
foreign affairs and national security issues.183
                                                 
178 Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 171.  Lower courts agreed with the Supreme Court that individual liberties could be 
infringed in time of war. Citizens Protective League v. Byrnes, 64 F. Supp. 233, 234 (D.D.C. 1946); Citizens 
Protective League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290, 294 (C.A.D.C. 1946). 
  As a result, courts have given the political 
179 Ludecke, 335 U.S. Id.  at 172-73.  See also U.S. v. Hack, 159 F.2d 552,554 (7th Cir. 1947) (affirming application 
of political question doctrine). 
180 Ludecke, 335 U.S. Id.  at 173 (Black, J. dissenting, with whom  Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge join.  
See also separate dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas, id. at 184). 
181 Id. at 186-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
182 See, e.g., Minotto, 252 F. at 604 (stating that Congress’  plenary power to legislate for aliens includes the ability 
to legislate for alien enemies without “violating the provisions of our Constitution”).  
183 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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branches significant discretion when it comes to defining the due process rights of non-
citizens.184
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex re. Mezei, a case arising shortly after World War II, 
the United States denied admission to a former long-term lawful permanent resident of the 
United States, who was returning from a trip abroad, on the basis of undisclosed national security 
concerns.
   
185
Mezei challenged his indefinite detention through a habeas corpus proceeding.  
Upholding Mezei’s continued exclusion and detention, the Court stated: “Courts have long 
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised 
by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.”
  Because Mezei had been been deemed a security risk by the United States, no other 
country would accept him, despite his best efforts to find another home.  As a result, Mezei was 
stranded on Ellis Island indefinitely.   
186  While 
acknowledging that aliens physically present on U.S. territory, even if illegally, are entitled to 
due process under the Constitution, the Court stated that Mezei was not entitled to due process 
because he had not “entered” the United States as that term is understood in immigration law.  
Accordingly, Mezei’s continued exclusion and detention did not infringe any constitutional 
rights.187
Nottebohm’s case is analogous to that of Mezei in that Nottebohm, like Mezei, was 
detained on U.S. territory, but was never lawfully admitted to the United States.  One main 
difference, however, is that Nottebohm did not come to the United States voluntarily seeking 
entry.  Instead, he was brought here against his will by the U.S. government.  Interestingly, the 
 
                                                 
184 See, e.g., Ekiu  v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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United States appears to have used immigration law as additional support for the detention of the 
Latin Americans by charging those who were brought here with being illegally present.188
The Nottebohm case is unlike Mezei in another respect.  While Mezei had no other 
country willing to accept him leading to his potentially indefinite detention, the Nottebohms all 
had other countries that were willing to take them in.  Both Kurt and Karl-Heinz eventually 
returned to Guatemala; Frederich went to Liechtenstein.  Thus, the Nottebohm case is unlike 
Mezei in that the Nottebohms were not asking the courts to allow them to enter the United 
States.
  The 
decision to use immigration law may have been very intentional given the wide latitude courts 
give to the political branches of government with respect to the treatment of non-U.S. citizens. 
189
B. International Law 
  Instead, they were simply asking to be released from detention.  How these foreigners 
might fare today is discussed in Part IV below. 
 International law as it existed during WWII also did not provide much assistance to the 
German detainees from Latin America.  There is strong support for the proposition that it is a 
breach of international law for a State to send its agents into the territory of another State to 
apprehend persons accused of a crime without that State’s consent.190
                                                 
188 See Banker Tells of U.S. Seizure in Guatemala, supra note 12. 
  However, the historical 
record of the Latin American Detention Program shows that the United States and the Latin 
American governments agreed to cooperate in the identification, arrest, and internment in other 
189 The recent Kiyemba case raises the same issue as Mezei – can the U.S. courts order the federal government to 
admit Uighurs detained at Guantanamo Bay to the United States if they cannot be removed to an appropriate foreign 
country?  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently answered that question in the negative and the U.S. Supreme 
Court refused to grant certiorari. See Kiyemba v. Obama, Case No. 08-5424, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 
2010);  Kiyemba v. Obama, Case No. 10-775, 131 S.Ct. 1631 (Apr. 18, 2011) (cert denied)  .   
190 See Sergio Euben Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.12/52, para. 12.3 (June 6, 1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. 
No. 40 (A/36/40), at 176 (1981), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/12-52.htm; Lilian 
Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Comm. No. R.13/56, para. 10.3 (July, 17 1979), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/36/40), at 185 (1981), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session36/13-56.htm; United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 678-80 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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countries of persons suspected of being enemy aliens.  Thus, the program described herein was 
created with the full cooperation of all the involved governments, eliminating any concerns about 
breaches of sovereignty.  Some scholars and  authors have argued, however, that the kidnapping 
and mass deportations of civilians from Latin America to the United States violated international 
humanitarian law that existed during WWII.191
1. Pan American Union and the Committee for Political Defense 
  This next section will describe the creation and 
execution of the program in light of then existing principles of international law. 
Cooperation between the United States and the other Latin American governments during 
this time period was largely carried out under the auspices of the Pan American Union.  The Pan 
American Union was so named at the Fourth American Conference of American States in 
Buenos Aires in 1910.  Through this umbrella organization, the American governments created a 
series of international agreements governing cooperation during war time and beyond.  Pursuant 
to these agreements, the Latin American governments identified persons who were German 
nationals living in their countries, arrested them, and turned them over to U.S. authorities, who 
brought them to the United States against their will to be detained in internment camps for the 
duration of the war. 
At the first meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held in 
Panama from September 23 to Oct. 3, 1939 following the outbreak of WWII, the governments 
adopted a recommendation on the coordination of police and judicial measures to prevent and 
repress unlawful activities that individuals may attempt in favor of foreign belligerent states.192
                                                 
191See Saito, supra note 88 at 304-05; Friedman, supra note 32 at 232. 
  
At the second meeting of the governments of the American Republics in Habana, Cuba in July 
1940, the governments agreed to convene an international conference to further coordinate their 
192 Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 7 (July 1943). 
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efforts with respect to police and judicial measures for the defense of society and the American 
States.193  The American governments further agreed to coordinate efforts “to eradicate from the 
Americas the spread of doctrines that tend to place in jeopardy the common inter-American 
democratic ideal.”194  They proposed a variety of measures designed to tighten their defenses, 
including proposals for precautionary measures in the granting of passports and the exercise of 
vigilance over the entry of nationals of non-American States.195
The Resolutions sought to defend the Americas against tactics practiced by the Nazis in 
Europe that led to the fall of several European States such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Denmark.
 
196  In particular, the American Republics sought “to protect themselves against the 
vanguard of the totalitarian attack – against the spy, saboteur, the propagandist, and the political 
agent operating under cover of diplomatic immunity.”197
The cornerstone of the political defense for the hemisphere was created at the Third 




At that Third Meeting, the governments recognized the need for ongoing and continuous 
communication.  Accordingly, they created the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee 
for Political Defense (“CPD”) to study the problems relating to political defense of the Continent 
  By that time, the United States had suffered the attack on Pearl Harbor and 
many of the American Republics had officially entered the war against the Axis powers of 
Germany, Italy and Japan.  
                                                 
193 Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, 35 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 7 (Jan. 
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194 Id. at 11. 
195 Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 7-8 (July 1943). 
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197 Id. at 8-9. 
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and to recommend appropriate measures.199   Members of the CPD were named by the 
Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the United States of America, Mexico, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela, who were to represent the interests of all twenty-one American Republics.200  The 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs approved three overall policy directives to be followed by CPD in 
carrying out its work.  The second of these policy directives is most relevant here.  It states: 
“Adequate defense against our fully identified aggressors is possible only if it is openly 
recognized that discriminatory measures must be taken against Axis nationals, since said 
aggressors use their nationals in the Americas as their first line of political attack.”201
The CPD held its first meeting on April 15, 1942.
   
202  During the course of its work, it 
submitted twenty-one programs of action to the governments of the American Republics.203  Its 
work was organized into four primary areas: (1) control of dangerous aliens; (2) prevention of 
the abuse of citizenship; (3) regulation of entry and exit of persons; and (4) prevention of acts of 
political aggression, such as espionage, sabotage, and subversive propaganda.204  The CPD 
believed that peacetime legislation was insufficient to deal with the threat presented by “the Axis 
pattern of total attack, predicated on an intense and world-wide campaign of political 
aggression.”205  Accordingly, its work took the form of resolutions that would provide the basis 
of laws or decrees to be adopted by the governments in accordance with their own domestic legal 
systems.206
                                                 
199 Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 9 (July 1943). 
 
200 Id. at 10-11. 
201 Id. at 10. 
202 Id. at 24. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 25.  As discussed in more detail in Part V below, similar arguments about the need for new laws to address 
a new kind of threat were made in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 
206 Id. at 24. 
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The CPD first recommended a system of registration and periodic reporting for all aliens 
as a method to help identify and control dangerous individuals.207  Violations of the program 
would be punishable by internment.208  The CPD also recommended that: “The security of the 
Hemisphere demands that all dangerous Axis nationals be totally deprived of their liberty of 
movement and of their power to undermine our institutions.”209  Accordingly, the CPD adopted 
Resolution XX, which recommends internment of dangerous Axis nationals within the 
Hemisphere for the duration of the emergency.210  Pursuant to Resolution XX, internment could 
occur in well-guarded detention camps in non-vital areas of the country where the arrest 
occurred.211  Alternatively, some American Republics concluded bilateral agreements for the 
expulsion and transfers of dangerous Axis agents and nationals to other Republics for interment 
for the duration of the war.212
Resolution XX also set forth a standard for “dangerousness.”  According to the 
Resolution, “a national of a member State of the Tripartite Pact or a State subservient thereto, 
who by his present or past conduct, indicates a predisposition to aid a member State of the 
Tripartite Pact, should be regarded as dangerous” and thus subject to detention.
  
213
                                                 
207 Id. at 25.  Shortly after 9/11/01, the U.S. government similarly implemented a new registration program for 
noncitizen Arabs and Muslims living in the United States.  See Part V infra. 
 There was no 
requirement that a person actually engage in dangerous conduct, only that the person show a 
propensity to do so.  Conduct deemed to indicate a “predisposition” included: (A) affiliation or 
208 Id. at 26. 
209 Id. at 28. 
210 Id. at 28-29.  The Committee considered the repatriation of Axis nationals, but decided against it because the 
repatriated nationals could provide valuable services to the Axis.  As discussed in more detail below, this argument 
also parallels one made in the current fight against terrorism, where U.S. government officials have argued against 
the release of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay because they might return to the battlefield.  See Part V infra. 
211 See Resolution XX, Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Nationals ¶ 3 (May 21, 1943), reprinted in the 
Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 73 (July 1943). 
212 See id.  See also Explanatory Statement to Resolution XX, Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis 
Nationals, (May 21, 1943), reprinted in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee 
for Political Defense 73 (July 1943). 
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support of a group that acts in the interest of a member State of the Tripartite Pact; (B) conduct 
giving sufficient grounds to believe that the person has or will engage in the illegal transmission 
or collection of vital information about the defense of the Hemisphere; (C) conduct giving 
sufficient grounds to believe that the person has or will commit acts of destruction or sabotage of 
materials or facilities vital to the defense of the Hemisphere; (D) conduct giving sufficient 
grounds to believe that the person has disseminated totalitarian propaganda or has incited others 
to act in the interest of a member State of the Tripartite Pact; (E) adherence to the totalitarian 
political ideology or pronounced sympathy therewith; (F) any other conduct indicating an 
intention to prejudice the defense and security of any American Republic in the interest of a 
member State of the Tripartite Pact.214
Interestingly, the CPD acknowledged in its Explanatory Statement about Resolution XX 
that these practices had already been followed by the American Republics.
   
215  Thus, it appears 
that the arrest and detention practices predated the formal legal authority for same.  In addition, 
the CPD stated that in exercising its powers of detention and expulsion, the American Republics 
“have wisely concluded that the Axis should not be permitted to take advantage of democratic 
respect for traditional concepts of International Law. . . using as a protection for their 
machinations the guarantees of the very democracy which they are seeking to destroy.”216
                                                 
214 Id. 
  On 
the other hand, the CPD recommended that the American Republics utilize the Geneva 
Convention of July 27, 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war as a general guide for 
215 See Explanatory Statement to Resolution XX, Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Nationals (May 21, 
1943), reprinted in the Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 
77 (July 1943). 
216 Id. 
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the detention of dangerous Axis agents to forestall any threats of mistreatment of Americans in 
Axis territory.217
In addition to Resolution XX on Detention and Expulsion, the CPD also adopted a 
Resolution on the Prevention of Abuses of Nationality, which gave States like Guatemala 
additional legal cover for their refusal to recognize any changes in citizenship by former German 
nationals and expropriation of the property of such persons.
 
218  The United States and other Latin 
American governments believed that internal security was threatened by a multitude of Axis 
agents who were carrying on their subversive activities within the Western Hemisphere and were 
acquiring American citizenship to cloak their activities.219  Thus, they recommended measures 
limiting the ability to acquire citizenship and providing for the loss of citizenship.220
All of this cooperative activity under the umbrella of the Pan American Union provided 
the legal basis for the United States to enter other Latin American countries, arrest accused alien 
enemies on foreign soil in cooperation with local authorities, and bring those persons to the 
United States for internment, as happened with the Nottebohms.  However, these international 
agreements did not address the human rights of those arrested and detained pursuant to the 
program in part because little international human rights law existed at the time. 
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treated humanely and protected from acts of violence or cruelty (art. 2), that they be lodged in safe and hygienic 
conditions (art. 10), and that they be provided with food, water and clothing, (art. 11-12), as well as basic health care 
(art. 13-15).  Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2021 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention].  See also Krammer, supra note 87 at 49. 
218 See Resolution XV, Prevention of Abuses of Nationality, reprinted in the Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 133 (July 1943). 
219 See Explanatory Statement to Resolution XV, Prevention of Abuses of Nationality, reprinted in the Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 133 (July 1943).  In 1942, a 
U.S. State Department memorandum asserted: “Many Axis nationals have obtained naturalization in the other 
American Republics in order to cloak their pro-Axis activities.”  “Memorandum regarding activities of the United 
States Government in removing from the other American Republics dangerous subversive aliens” supra note 107 at 
at 4.  
220 See id. at 135. 
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2. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Treaties 
 With the exception of certain principles in the laws of war, most modern international 
human rights norms which might have benefitted detainees such as the Nottebohms had not yet 
developed at the time of World War II.  The United Nations (UN) Charter, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants of Civil and Political Rights and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the American Declaration of Human Rights, 
were all written after the war.  Thus, the detainees had very little international human rights law 
to rely on during WWII.  
One legal exception detainees could have possibly used was in the area of the laws of 
war, also known as international humanitarian law.  The modern-day Geneva Conventions III 
and IV of 1949, which govern the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians during 
armed hostilities, did not yet exist.  Nevertheless, the Geneva Convention of 1929 set forth some 
basic rules with respect to the treatment of POWs.221  And while there were no comparable 
treaties dealing with the alien enemy civilians interned in the territory of a belligerent nation,222
 In addition to requiring that the detaining Power treat detainees humanely, the 1929 
Geneva Convention set forth rules regarding trials and penal sanctions for POWs.  Article 45 
provides that POWs are subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in effect in the armed forces 
of the detaining Power.
 
as noted above, it was U.S. policy to treat detainees humanely in accordance with the 1929 
Geneva Convention on POWs.   
223
                                                 
221 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 217 at art. 2, 9, 11-15.  Some scholars argue that at least some of the 
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions codified customary international law already existing at the time of 
WWII and thus may be applied to that conflict.  See Saito, supra note 88 at 305.  This issue is discussed in 
connection with the 1949 Geneva Conventions below. 
  Article 61 provides for basic due process rights such as notice and 
222 Harris, supra note 136 at 1360. 
223 1929 Geneva Convention, supra note 217 at art. 45. 
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opportunity to be heard.224  Article 62 guarantees that the POW shall have the right to be assisted 
by a qualified advocate of his own choice.  If the POW does not make such a choice, the 
Protecting Power may procure an advocate for the detainee.225  Also of relevance here, Article 75 
of the 1929 Geneva Convention provides that POWs shall be repatriated as soon as possible after 
the conclusion of peace.226
 In addition to the 1929 Geneva Convention, a few customary rules of international 
humanitarian law may have been applicable to the U.S. Latin-American Detention Program 
during WWII.  For example, at least one scholar, Professor Natsu Taylor Saito, has argued that 
the prohibition on individual and mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected 
persons (civilians) from occupied territory now found in Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention already existed in the form of customary international law during WWII.
  However, none of these guarantees are referred to in the cases and 
materials relating to the alien enemy review board proceedings, suggesting that these due process 
guarantees were not extended to civilian detainees in that context. 
227  He 
further argues that these prohibitions were applicable to the arrests, detentions, and deportations 
of Germans and Japanese from Latin America.228
One problem with Professor Saito’s argument is that it assumes the individuals involved 
were innocent civilians.  It is likely that the U.S. and Latin American governments responsible 
for these programs would have argued that they were only concerned with “dangerous enemy 
aliens” in accordance with the CPD’s Resolutions, even if it was later discovered that there was 
insufficient evidence of dangerousness in individual cases.  In addition, these rules of 
   
                                                 
224 Id at art. 61. 
225 Id. at art. 62. 
226 Id. at art. 75. 
227 See Saito, supra note 88 at 305-08. 
228 Saito’s case study focuses on Japanese from Peru, some of whom were forced to engage in slave labor in Panama 
and many of whom were sent back to Japan against their wishes.  See id.  The Japanese-Peruvians’ situation thus 
involves additional levels of misconduct as compared to Germans who were not required to perform forced labor 
and who were ultimately allowed to return to Latin America. 
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international humanitarian law tend to be concerned with persons in an occupied territory, and 
neither Latin America nor the United States was an occupied territory.  Accordingly, some of the 
customary international humanitarian law rules may not have been strictly applicable.  And, as 
illustrated by the Ludecke and Nottebohm decisions, both domestic and international courts were 
extremely deferential to the political branches of government in wartime.  Thus, it is likely that 
the government would have won any legal challenges based on customary international law.   
In retrospect, not enough investigation was done to determine whether the accused alien 
enemies from Latin America were truly dangerous before removing them from their homes.  
However, it is difficult to conclude that the U.S. Latin American Detention Program was clearly 
illegal under international law existing at the time. 
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IV. Would the Result Be Any Different Today? 
The Alien Enemy Act remains in the statute books unchanged to this day.  However, the 
government has not relied upon the statute since World War II, most likely because the statute 
applies in times of declared war and Congress has not officially declared war since WWII.  If the 
government were to invoke the AEA today as a basis for detaining enemy aliens, changes in U.S. 
statutory and constitutional law and international human rights law strongly suggest that a 
similar program today would not withstand judicial scrutiny.  On the other hand, there are many 
aspects of the current program to identify, arrest, detain, and try suspected terrorists or “unlawful 
enemy combatants” that resemble the Latin American Detention program.  Some of those aspects 
are currently being litigated.  As a result, the legal status remains unclear and it is difficult to 
predict final outcomes.  That said, there have been some changes in the law that require detainees 
to be given more rights than they were in the 1940s.  This next section describes how the law has 
evolved and how detainees in the war on terror are or are not treated differently today as a result. 
  A. U.S. Law  
 1. Equal Protection and Due Process 
Our understanding of the scope of rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ Due Process Clauses and the Equal Protection Clause have changed dramatically 
since World War II.  Moreover, courts have indicated somewhat more willingness today to 
examine executive branch action during war time for consistency with basic human rights than 
they did in the 1940s.  As the Supreme Court stated in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Executive Branch 
does not have a “blank check” even in wartime.229
                                                 
229 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
  
542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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The most famous case from the World War II era challenging the constitutionality of the 
detention of civilians is, of course, Korematsu v. United States.230  There, the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld Fred Korematsu’s conviction for violating a 1942 military order excluding all 
persons of Japanese ancestry from certain portions of the U.S. West Coast.231  The Court held 
that the pressing public necessity of preventing espionage or sabotage by disloyal persons of 
Japanese ancestry justified deference to the military’s judgment that all persons of Japanese 
ancestry must be excluded from the Pacific Coast.232  The Korematsu decision has since been 
highly criticized, including by the Supreme Court,233 as being contrary to equal protection, and 
Korematsu’s conviction was ultimately vacated, along with the two other men convicted with 
him.234  In addition, on August 10, 1988, former U.S. President Reagan signed into law the Civil 
Rights Act of 1988, which ordered the payment of $20,000 to the Japanese-American survivors 
of internment.235 Further, on October 1, 1993, former U.S. President Clinton issued a letter of 
apology to Mr. Korematsu calling the treatment of Japanese–Americans during the war “unjust” 
and “rooted deeply in racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack of political leadership.”236
                                                 
230 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
   
231 Id. at 217-18. 
232 Id. at 218. 
233 See e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995). 
234 A U.S. District Court in San Francisco, California vacated Korematsu’s conviction on November 11, 1983; in 
October 1985, a federal court in Portland, Oregon vacated Minoru Yasui’s conviction for violating curfew; and in 
1986, a federal court in Seattle, Washington vacated Gordon Hirabayashi’s 1942 conviction for violating wartime 
internment orders. See Historical Overview of Japanese Americans & the U.S. Constitution, 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/perfectunion/resources/history.html. 
235 P.L. 100-383, 1988 H.R. 442.  See also Historical Overview of Japanese and U.S. Constitution, 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/perfectunion/resources/history.html. 
236 Letter from President Bill Clinton dated October 1, 1993, available at 
http://www.landmarkcases.org/korematsu/leterofapology.html. 
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No such apology has been offered to any other ethnic groups detained during the war, such as the 
Germans from Latin America.237
Since WWII, the U.S. Supreme Court has even more firmly established that strict 
scrutiny applies to classifications based on race.
 
238  Similarly, it has repeatedly held that state 
laws that classify on the basis of alienage are subject to strict scrutiny.239
2. Arrest, Detention and Trial of Unlawful Enemy Combatants 
 The reaction to 
Korematsu and the evolution in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence suggests  it 
is likely the government would need a more compelling reason than just nationality or ancestry 
to justify removing persons from their homes, families, communities and jobs and placing them 
in indefinite detention today.  
In the current war on terror, the government has relied on various exercises of statutory 
and presidential authority as the basis for its arrest, detention, and trial of suspected unlawful 
enemy combatants and other suspected terrorists.  For example, the government has used the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),240 coupled with the President’s 2001 military 
order on the “Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism,”241 the Military Commissions Act (MCA),242
                                                 
237 However, legislation to this effect has been proposed in Congress.  See, e.g., Wartime Treatment Study Act, H.R. 
1425 (2009) (An Act “[t]o establish commissions to review the facts and circumstances surrounding injustices 
suffered by European Americans, European Latin Americans, and Jewish refugees during World War II”). 
 the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
238 See e.g., City of Richmond, 488 U.S.at 507; Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 214. 
239 See. e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). In 
contrast, the Supreme Court has usually applied minimal scrutiny to federal laws that classify on the basis of 
alienage in deference to the federal government’s traditional control over immigration. See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67 (1976). But see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60-61 (2001) (court applied intermediate scrutiny to a 
gender-based difference in the way mothers and fathers are treated under the Immigration and Nationality Act, but 
left open application for other cases). 
240 Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (note following 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000 ed., Supp. V)). 
241 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).  The November 13 Order vested in the Secretary of Defense the power to 
appoint military commissions to try certain persons when there is reason to believe the person is or was a member of 
Al-Qaeda or has engaged in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the United States.  See id.; see also Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  
242 10 U.S.C. § 948a, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Supp. 2007). 
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(DTA),243 the Military Commissions Act of 2009,244 and various Executive Orders.245  Some of 
the relevant provisions of these authorities and how they have been interpreted by courts is 
described below.  In particular, the issues of indefinite detention, fair trial, and a right to counsel 
are the focus of this discussion because of the parallels between the treatment of accused alien 
enemies in the Latin American Detention Program and the treatment of suspected terrorists 
today.246
a. Indefinite Detention 
 
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress authorized the 
President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or 
persons he determines” are responsible for those terrorist attacks.247  The President then issued a 
Military Order on November 13, 2001 authorizing the detention and trial by military commission 
of non-citizens in the war on terror.248
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
 
249 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the President’s 
authority to detain persons  for the duration of the conflict in which they were captured as a 
“fundamental and accepted incident of war.”250  In that case, an American citizen was captured 
by members of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. military there.  
The U.S. government accused Hamdi of being an “enemy combatant” and asserted the authority 
to hold him indefinitely without formal charges or proceedings.251
                                                 
243 Pub. L. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739. 
  U.S. authorities initially 
244 The MCA of 2009 was part of an omnibus spending bill - “NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010” - Pub. Law 111-84.  The MCA is Title 18.  It is codified as 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a - 950t. 
245 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13277 (March 7, 2011). 
246 This article is not an attempt to address all the procedural aspects of trials by military commissions, but only a 
few where sufficient information is available to compare WWII practices to current practices. 
247 AUMF, supra note 240. 
248 66 Fed. Reg. at 57833. 
249 542 U. S. 507 (2004). 
250 Id. at 518. 
251 See id. at 510. 
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brought Hamdi to Guantanamo Bay, but then transferred him to a U.S. Navy Brig off the U.S. 
coast upon learning that he was a U.S. citizen.252  When Hamdi challenged his detention without 
a hearing, the U.S. Supreme Court held that while a U.S. citizen may be detained as an enemy 
combatant, that detention cannot be indefinite.  Citing Article 118 of the Third Geneva 
Convention,253 the Court stated that the detention may only last as long as hostilities.254  The 
Court further held that the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires that a U.S. 
citizen be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention before a 
neutral decision-maker.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court 
for further proceedings.255
Likewise, in the civil immigration context, the U.S. Supreme Court has disallowed 
statutory authority that would have permitted the indefinite detention of both admissible and 
inadmissible noncitizens.
     
256  The Court stated that such indefinite detention would raise “serious 
constitutional problems” under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and thus interpreted 
the statute to imply a reasonable limit to the amount of time an alien may be detained following 
an order of removal.257
                                                 
252 See id. 
  Thus, while the executive may detain persons deemed to be 
253 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
(1950) (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”).  
The United States is a party to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions.  A full list of States Parties is available on the 
website of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P. 
254 Hamdi, 542 U.S. 520-21. However, given the potentially endless nature of the war on terrorism and the precedent 
of Ludecke, that detention has no certain ending point in sight.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, LUDECKE’S LENGTHENING 
SHADOW: THE DISTURBING PROSPECT OF WAR WITHOUT END, 2 J. Nat’l Sec. L. & Pol’y 53, 94 (2006).  
255 After the court’s decision, the U.S. released Hamdi and allowed him to travel to Saudi Arabia in exchange for 
renunciation of his U.S. citizenship. 
256 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (involving an alien who was admitted to U.S.); Clark v. Martinez, 
543 U.S. 371 (2005) (involving an inadmissible alien). 
257 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. 
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dangerous,258
  b. Trial 
 both the U.S. Constitution and international law place limits on that power of 
detention. 
As of this writing, hearings for suspected unlawful enemy combatants are being 
conducted by way of military commissions.259  The most recent regulations for the conduct of 
military commissions under the Military Commissions Act of 2009 were issued in the form of a 
revised Manual for Military Commissions (MMC) in April 2010 and are just now being 
implemented.260
Section 1005 of the DTA authorizes the creation of Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs) and Administrative Review Boards for the purpose of determining the status of the 
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and to provide annual reviews to determine the continued 
need to detain aliens there.
  This section will first describe some of the legal issues that arose under the 
DTA of 2005 and then how the new MCA and MMC address those issues.  
261  The U.S. Secretary of Defense is charged with creating the 
procedures for the CSRTs.  However, the DTA also provides that the person designated as the 
final review authority be a civilian; that the procedures provide for the consideration of any new 
evidence that may become available regarding the enemy combatant status of a detainee; and that 
there be consideration of the probative value of any detainee’s statement that may have been 
obtained by coercion.262
                                                 
258 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (permitting detention of aliens beyond removal period if 
considered a risk to the community). 
  The DTA limited appeals of decisions from CSRTs and military 
commissions, providing in particular that no court shall have jurisdiction to hear an application 
259 While maintaining support for criminal trials in federal court, on March 7, 2011, President Obama issued an 
Executive Order authorizing the continued use of military commissions and establishing a periodic review for 
detainees.  See Executive Order 13567, supra note 245. 
260 U.S. Dept. of Defense, Manual for Military Commissions (2010 edition) [hereinafter 2010 MMC], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/2010_Manual_for_Military_Commissions.pdfhttp://www.defense.gov/news/2010_M
anual_for_Military_Commissions.pdf. 
261 DTA, supra note 243 at § 1005. 
262Id. 
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for habeas corpus filed by a detainee and that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any final decision 
by the CSRTs.263
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme set up by 
the DTA.
   
264  In Hamdan, a Yemeni national, who was allegedly Osama Bin Laden’s chauffeur, 
was captured by militia forces in Afghanistan and turned over to the U.S. military.  He was taken 
to Guantanamo Bay in 2002; determined to be eligible for trial by military commission over a 
year later; and, in mid-2004, charged with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by 
military commission.265
Hamdan filed a writ of habeas corpus in U.S. federal court, alleging that the military 
commission the President convened lacked authority because neither Congressional action nor 
the laws of war support trial by military commission for the crime of conspiracy.
   
266  The Court 
upheld the President’s power to establish military commissions under both U.S. law and the laws 
of war. 267  However, the Court held that the President’s power to convene such commissions is 
also limited by the U.S. Constitution, U.S. statutes such as the UCMJ, and the international law 
of war.268
Ultimately, the Court agreed with Hamdan that the military commission convened to try 
him lacked power to proceed because its structure and procedures violated the UCMJ and the 
Geneva Conventions.
   
269
                                                 
263 Id. 
  More specifically, the Court held that Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions applied and that the military commission was not a “regularly constituted court 
264 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
265 See id. at 566. 
266 See id. at 567. 
267 The Court stated that the President’s power derives from Article 21 of the UCMJ, the DTA, the AUMF, and the 
President’s own powers as Commander in Chief under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  See id. at 592-95.  
268 See id. at 597-612. 
269 See id. at 567. 
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affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,” 
as required by that article.270 Of relevance here, the Court held that the procedural protections 
provided for detainees were insufficient because (1) the accused may be excluded from learning 
what evidence is presented against him; (2) the rules permit the admission of any evidence that in 
the opinion of the presiding officer has probative value; and (3) a two-thirds vote will suffice 
both for a guilty verdict and a sentence (other than the death sentence).271
The requirement of Geneva Convention Common Article 3 of “a regularly constituted 
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civilized 
peoples” was reaffirmed in Boumediene v. Bush, another case involving the DTA.
   
272  There, the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down portions of the Act because it unconstitutionally suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus.273  In addition, the Court noted several procedural deficiencies with 
CRSTs, including that: (1) detainees are assigned a “personal representative” who is not the 
detainee’s lawyer or even advocate; (2) government evidence is accorded a presumption of 
validity and there are no limits on the admission of hearsay evidence (except that it be relevant 
and helpful); (3) the detainee is allowed to present “reasonably available” evidence, but his 
ability to rebut government evidence is limited by circumstances of confinement and lack of 
counsel; and (4) the detainee can only access the unclassified portion of the “Government 
Information” and so may not be aware of critical allegations against him.274
                                                 
270 See id. at 630-32. 
  These recent 
detainee cases are remarkable in that the Supreme Court was willing to provide accused alien 
271 Id. at 613-15, 634-35 
272 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).   
273 Id. at 2240. 
274 Id. at 2260. As with the boards used to try enemy aliens in Nottebohm’s time, the first military commissions 
convened to try persons in the war on terror had only one legally trained person – a retired army judge – as part of 
the panel.  The other members of the commission had no legal training.  There also was a huge imbalance between 
the legal resources of the government and those allowed the detainee.  See Andy Worthington, THE GUANTANAMO 
FILES 266 (2007).  Post-Boumediene, the rules have been revised so that military judges preside over military 
commission hearings.  2010 MMC, supra note 260 at Rule 501. 
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unlawful enemy combatants with more process than was due Korematsu, Ludecke, or Mezei and 
the Court was less deferential to the Executive in a time when national security was 
threatened.275  For example, as discussed in more detail below, detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
undergo periodic review of their detention and, unlike Ludecke, are now entitled to private 
counsel at government expense in addition to a personal representative.  Additionally, detainees 
are entitled to all information relied upon by the government, except in “exceptional 
circumstances,” in which case, the detainee is entitled to “a sufficient substitute or summary.”276
Congress responded to the Boumediene decision by enacting the Military Commissions 
Act of 2009.  More recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented that Act by 
amending the MMC in 2010.  The 2010 MMC provides extensive and detailed Rules for Military 
Commissions (RMCs).  The MMC has jurisdiction with respect to all crimes covered by Chapter 
47A of Title 10 of the United States Code and the laws of war and jurisdiction to try “any alien 
unprivileged enemy belligerent.” 
  
277  In addition, the MMC is given the power to determine 
whether  an alien is a privileged or unprivileged enemy combatant within the meaning of Article 
V of Geneva Convention IV.278  Trials of persons arrested and detained by the United States in 
the war on terror are now being conducted pursuant to these rules.  The new MMC appears to 
correct many of the procedural deficiencies noted by the Supreme Court thus far.  For example, 
Rule 505 of the MMC provides that a defendant has a right to see evidence used against him,279
                                                 
275 These decisions are consistent with an expansion of due process rights for noncitizens outside the national 
security context as well.  See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (returning lawful permanent resident is 
entitled to hearing before being excluded). 
.  
The new MMC also provides for the right to counsel, as explained in more detail below. 
276 See e.g., Executive Order 13567, supra note 245 at para. 4-5.  What constitutes a “sufficient substitute” is not 
clear and will likely be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
277 2010 MMC, supra, note 260 at RMC 201 & 202. 
278 See id. at 202. 
279 See id. at RMC 505 (“Any information admitted into evidence pursuant to any rule, 
procedure, or order by the military judge shall be provided to the accused.”) 
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3. Right to Counsel 
The right to counsel was just beginning to be established in U.S. law at the time of World 
War II.  For example, it was not until 1938 that the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to 
counsel in criminal cases in federal courts is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.280  The Sixth Amendment was held to apply to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright.281  Despite the prior lack of recognition of de jure 
protection, it was fairly common practice by 1942 for states to provide counsel on request to 
indigent defendants who were charged with capital and serious non-capital offenses.282 Later, the 
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all cases where there 
is a potential loss of liberty as a result of a criminal prosecution.283  By contrast, it is widely 
recognized that no concurrent right to counsel exists for parties to civil actions.284
In the context of immigration law, once an alien is in the United States, the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects the alien as a “person” against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.
 
285  However, an alien's right to due process in immigration 
proceedings is only that process which Congress has determined is due.286  Aliens have a 
statutory right to counsel under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), but at their own 
expense. 287
                                                 
280 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 There is no right to counsel paid for by the government because immigration 
proceedings are considered civil, not criminal.  In addition to this statutory right, aliens have a 
281 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
282 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 477and appendix (1942) (Black, J. dissenting). 
283 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (1972). 
284 Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209 (1982). 
285 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973); Plyer v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any 
ordinary sense of that term.  Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been 
recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”) . 
286 U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct. 309, 94 L. Ed. 317 (1950); Jean v. 
Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983), on reh'g on other grounds, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), judgment aff'd, 
472 U.S. 846, 105 S. Ct. 2992, 86 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1985). 
287 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4). 
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Fifth Amendment procedural due process right to counsel in some cases.288  This Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel is derived from the principle that due process requires that 
proceedings be fundamentally fair and lack of counsel may deprive an immigration proceeding 
of its fundamental fairness.289
The United States has struggled with the issue of access to counsel by suspected 
terrorists, and has attempted to restrict the right in some cases.  For example, in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld,
 
290 an American citizen accused of being an “enemy combatant” was initially 
forbidden to see a lawyer at all, but was later permitted to see a lawyer only in the presence of 
U.S. military observers.291  After Hamdi’s father filed a lawsuit on his behalf, the U.S. District 
Court appointed a public defender to represent him.292  The U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
finally resolve Hamdi’s claims regarding access to counsel because by the time his case reached 
the Supreme Court, the Court stated that it did not need to consider the issue given that Hamdi 
had been appointed counsel and had been permitted unmonitored meetings with his lawyer.293
In Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court noted several procedural deficiencies 
with respect to the CSRTs, including that detainees are assigned a “personal representative” who 
is not the detainee’s lawyer or even advocate. 
  
294  The Court’s opinion hinted, but did not 
declare, that a noncitizen has a right to counsel in this context.  The Court held that the CSRT 
procedures, taken together, fell far short of the procedures and mechanisms that would eliminate 
the need for habeas corpus review.295
                                                 
288 Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 638 (BIA 1988). 
   
289 See, e.g., Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 735 (9th Cir. 2000). 
290 542 U. S. 507 (2004). 
291 See id. at 511. 
292 See id. 
293 See id. at 539. 
294 Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2260, 2269.  The Court further noted that General Yamashita and the German saboteurs 
in Quirin, two other World War II era trials by military commission, got lawyers.  See id. at 2271. 
295 Id. at 2260.   
 53 
As a result of these court decisions, Congress amended the law again with the Military 
Commissions Act of 2009.  As noted above, the DOD implemented the MCA by way of the 
MMC in April 2010.  MMC Rule 506 establishes a right to counsel at government expense.296
B. International Law 
  
Thus, the United States is now providing all detainees being tried before military commissions 
with free counsel if the detainee so chooses.   
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, treaties to which the United States 
is a party are part of the supreme law of the land.297  U.S. law also includes rules of customary 
international law. 298
In 2002, then U.S. President Bush unilaterally determined that the alleged al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees at Guantanamo Bay were not prisoners of war (POWs) or civilians within the 
meaning of Article 4 of Geneva Convention III
 Both of these sources of international law contain relevant rules regarding 
the detention and trial of persons during wartime and peacetime.   
299 or IV300 respectively.301
                                                 
296 See 2010 MMC, supra note 260 at RMC 506. 
  President Bush made 
this decision without first convening a competent tribunal to determine the status of the detainees 
297 U.S. Const. art. VI. 
298 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and must be 
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right 
depending on it are duly presented for their determination.  For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized 
nations. ”)  
299 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art 4, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. 
300 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3516 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
301 White House Memorandum, “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees” (Feb. 7, 
2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf. 
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as required by Article 5 of Geneva Convention III.302  Such tribunals have since been established 
by statute and their work is ongoing.303
Despite initially determining that the detainees did not have a right to protected status 
under the Geneva Conventions, President Bush determined that the detainees would be treated 
“humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner 
consistent with the principles of Geneva.”
 
304  In both Hamdan and Boudemiene, the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined that, at a minimum, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is 
applicable to the detainees.305  Thus, although the status of these detainees under U.S. and 
international law is not entirely clear, the Geneva Conventions may be used as guidance in 
answering the questions posed by the arrest, detention and trial of foreigners brought to the 
U.S.306
 1. Indefinite Detention and Trial 
  The next section discusses relevant international law principles. 
Both Geneva Convention III (POWs)307 and Geneva Convention IV (civilians) permit 
internment of prisoners of war and civilians, but civilians may be interned “only if the Security 
of the Detaining Party makes it absolutely necessary.”308
                                                 
302 Geneva Convention III, supra note 299 at art. V. 
  Even if a person is not a POW or a 
“protected person” within the meaning of Geneva Convention IV, who is entitled to invoke the 
full protections of the treaty, Article 5 of that Convention still guarantees civilians a certain 
minimum level of protection, including a right to a fair and regular trial: 
303 For example, the trial by military commission of Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen and the youngest detainee at 
Guantanamo Bay, is described on the Human Rights First website at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/detainees/cases/khadr.aspx. 
304 White House Memorandum, “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees” ¶ 3 (Feb. 7, 
2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf. 
305 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629. 
306 Regardless of their legal status, all detainees are entitled to a fair trial under both international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law.  See David Weissbrodt & Andrea Templeton, FAIR TRIALS? THE MANUAL FOR 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS IN LIGHT OF COMMON ARTICLE 3 AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 26 Law & Ineq. 353, 
358 (2008). 
307 Geneva Convention III, supra note 299 at art. 21. 
308 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 300 at art. 42. 
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Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or 
saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security 
of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military 
security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication 
under the present Convention. 
 
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and, in 
case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed 
by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges 
of a protected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent 
with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may be.309
 
 
In addition, Geneva Convention IV states: “Protected persons accused of offenses shall be 
detained in the occupied country, and if convicted, they shall serve their sentences therein.”310
With respect to the length of detention, Geneva Convention III also only permits 
detention as long as hostilities continue.
  
This article suggests that a country must first determine whether an accused person is a protected 
person within the meaning of the Convention.  If so, the transfer of the detainee to another 
country for detention and trial as the United States did with many of the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay would not be consistent with the Geneva Convention.   
311  Likewise, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions states that, “persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any 
event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to 
exist.”312  Additionally, any internment or imprisonment of civilians must be proportionate to the 
offense committed.313
                                                 
309 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 300 at art. 5 (emphasis added).  See also THOMAS M. MCDONNELL, THE 
UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 106-114 (2010). 
  Indefinite detention is thus not permitted by international humanitarian 
310 Id. at art. 76. 
311 See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 299 art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated 
without delay upon the cessation of hostilities.”).   
312 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflict, art 75, 1125 U.N.T.S. 1979.  The United States has signed, but has not ratified the 
Additional Protocol. 
313 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 300 at art. 68. 
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law.  However, in the current war on terror, it is difficult to know when, if ever, hostilities will 
end. 
With respect to trials, as stated above, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
requires trial of prisoners of war and detained civilians by “a regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensible by civilized 
peoples.”314  And specifically regarding civilians, Article 71 of Geneva Convention IV states that 
“no sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a 
regular trial.”315  Even persons suspected of activities hostile to the security of the State or 
persons accused of being spies or saboteurs have a right to a “fair and regular trial” pursuant to 
Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV.316  Further, accused persons shall be notified of the charges 
against them and brought to trial promptly.317  They also have the right to present evidence, call 
witnesses, and be represented by counsel.318 Article 75 of Additional Protocol I further expands 
on what constitutes a fair trial and includes, inter alia, a presumption of innocence until proven 
guilty, as well as bans on ex post facto laws, double jeopardy, and self-incrimination.319
International humanitarian law as reflected in the Geneva Conventions is supplemented 
by international human rights law.
 
320
                                                 
314 Id. at art. 3. 
  In this regard, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
declares in Article 7 that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection 
315 Id. at art. 71. 
316 Id. at art. 5.  See also McDonnell, supra note 309 at 110-11. 
317 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 300 at art. 71. 
318 See id. at art. 72. 
319 Additional Protocol I, at art. 75. 
320 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2004 I.C.J. 
Rep. 136, para. 106 (July 9); Coard v. United States, Case 10.951 Inter. Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, para. 39-40 
(1999).  International law scholars have also argued that the MMC should be interpreted in light of U.S. treaty 
obligations to remain consistent with its legal obligations and to preserve its reputation as a promoter of human 
rights.  See Weissbrodt & Templeton, supra note 306 at 354. 
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of the law without discrimination on the basis of race or national origin.321  Article 9 states that 
no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention and Article 10 guarantees a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of any criminal charges.322
Articles 2 and 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
likewise guarantee equality before the law without discrimination.
   
323  The ICCPR also prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention and states that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law.324  Article 9 requires that a person 
who is arrested be promptly informed of the reasons for the arrest and the charges against him. In 
criminal trials, the accused have a right to a fair and public hearing before an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.325  Article 14 provides the right to examine witnesses.  In 
addition, everyone convicted of a crime has the right to have his conviction and sentence 
reviewed by a higher tribunal in accordance with law.326
The standards set forth in international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law, taken together, establish the minimum level of due process guaranteed to all persons, 
regardless of nationality, who are arrested, detained, and tried by any State.  As a party to the 
Geneva Conventions and the ICCPR, the United States is bound to follow those treaties as a 
matter of law.  The United States is also bound by customary international law as set forth in 
 
                                                 
321 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 7, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR (III 1948).  Although not a treaty, the 
Universal Declaration is considered binding customary international law.  Thomas Buergenthal, et al, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 42 (4th ed. 2009). 
322 Id. at art. 9, 10. 
323 ICCPR at art. 2 and 3, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).  The U.S. is a party to the ICCPR. 
324 Id. at art. 9. 
325 Id. at art. 14.  In its interpretive comments to the ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has 
further defined Article 14 as requiring that the tribunal be established by law, that it be independent of the executive 
and legislative branches of government and that it enjoy judicial independence in deciding legal matters.  See U.N. 
Human Rights Comm., Aug. 23, 2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 ¶ 18 [hereinafter UNHRC General Comment No. 
32].  Article 14’s requirements apply to all courts including military tribunals.  See id. at ¶ 22. 
326 Id. at art. 14(5). 
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documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.327  And although national 
security is a basis for derogations from certain human rights guarantees, there are both temporal 
and substantive limits on the ability of a state to invoke national security to justify such 
derogations.328
These international standards must inform the development of procedures for the military 
commissions used to try detainees in the war on terror, both to comply with the United States’ 
international legal obligations and to maintain its reputation as a country that promotes and 
abides by human rights and the rule of law.
 
329 As of this writing, the United States is conducting 
proceedings against detainees before military commissions and is using new procedures for those 
commissions developed in response to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court as described 
herein.330
                                                 
327 Buergenthal, supra note 321 at 42. 
    Whether the new procedures set forth in the 2010 MMC meet the legal requirements 
for fair trials remains to be seen. 
328 See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 321 at art. 29; ICCPR, supra note 323 art. 4. 
329 See Weissbrodt & Templeton, supra note 306 at 355, 390-400. 
330 Information regarding pending cases before military commissions at Guantanamo Bay may be found on the U.S. 
Department of Defense website, available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/.  
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2. Right to Counsel in International law 
 International humanitarian law also provides a right to counsel, at least for civilians.  In 
this regard, Geneva Convention IV affords civilians “the right to be assisted by a qualified 
advocate or counsel of their own choice.”331  “Failing a choice by the accused, the Protecting 
Power may provide him with an advocate or counsel.”332  If the charges are sufficiently serious, 
the Occupying Power may be required to provide counsel to the accused.333
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR specifically addresses the right to counsel in criminal 
proceedings.
  
334  Pursuant to Article 14(3), every criminal defendant is able to communicate with 
counsel of his own choosing and to have that legal counsel assist in his defense.335  If the 
defendant cannot pay, the defendant has a right to have legal assistance assigned to him if the 
interest of justice so requires. 336
The legislative history of the ICCPR suggests that the right to counsel in civil cases was 
left out because it was seen as less critical because many states had already granted a civil right 
while many more countries lacked the right in criminal proceedings.
  
337  The United States 
unsuccessfully sponsored a proposal that would have granted a right to counsel in cases 
involving fundamental human rights.338
                                                 
331 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 300 at art. 72. 
  Regardless, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the 
332 Id. (emphasis added).  A Protecting Power is a state that is not taking active part in the armed conflict, but which 
agrees to look after the interests of another State that is a party to the conflict. 
333 Id. An Occupying Power is a State that occupies the territory of another State. 
334 ICCPR, supra note 323 at art. 14. 
335 See UNHCR General Comment No. 32, supra note 325 at ¶¶ 32-34. 
336 See id. at ¶ 38. 
337 Martha F. Davis, In the Interests of Justice: Human Rights and the Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 25 TOURO L. 
REV. 147, 160 (2009). 
338 Id. at 159-161. 
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interpretive body of the ICCPR, has made it clear that Article 14 applies to all courts and 
tribunals, civilian and miltary.339
 The Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), to which the United States 
also belongs, contains an explicit provision calling for the right to legal aid.
   
340  Adopted at the 
same time, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man did not explicitly call for a 
civil right to counsel, but did call for fair and easy access to courts.341
Thus, while there is no universally recognized right to counsel in all proceedings, since 
WWII there has certainly been an enormous growth in the recognition of the right to counsel in 
proceedings that may result in a loss of liberty both domestically and internationally.  This 
evolution in our understanding of the importance of counsel may help explain why the United 
States is now providing lawyers to detainees at Guantanamo Bay. 
 
V. Parallels with the Arrest, Detention and Trial of Suspected Foreign Terrorists Today 
A comparison of some of the tactics and procedures used to arrest, detain, and try “alien 
enemies” during World War II with those that are being used to arrest, detain and try suspected 
terrorists or “unlawful enemy combatants” today suggests that not all of the ghosts of World War 
II have been exorcised.  There are still some timely lessons that may be learned from the U.S. 
Latin American Detention program and the treatment of “alien enemies” during times of conflict 
                                                 
339 Id.  See UNHCR General Comment No. 32, supra note 325 at ¶ 22. In conformity with these comments, states 
often address the right to civil counsel in their compliance reports and the HRC often seeks information regarding 
compliance with these comments from countries appearing before it.  See Davis, supra note 337 at 162.  A right to 
counsel in some civil matters has been found in connection with rights protected by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.  See 
id. 
340 Charter of the Organization of the American States, art. 45(i), opened for signature Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 
1609 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951). 
341 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XVIII, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth 
International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in 
the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). The American Declaration, like the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights was not adopted as a treaty, but is considered part of customary 
international law and is used to interpret the fundamental rights protected by the OAS Charter.  See Buergenthal, 
supra note 321 at 262. 
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that have relevance for current U.S. policies regarding suspected “unlawful enemy combatants” 
today.   
The accuracy of the United States’ understanding of the scope of the threat presented by 
potential subversive German nationals living in Latin America around the time of WWII was 
negatively influenced by the fact that the United States had inadequate intelligence and only a 
rudimentary foreign intelligence service in Latin America.342  U.S. military officers shunned 
posts in Latin America “because such backwater postings were ‘prejudicial to their 
promotion.’”343  Thus, the personnel that could not avoid being assigned to Latin America tended 
to be less competent and less experienced.344
In addition, the United States lacked sufficient field operatives in Latin America who 
were fluent in Spanish and other foreign languages spoken there.  The FBI agents were generally 
provided with little training and only two weeks of language instruction.
   
345  Historian Max 
Friedman asserts: “The FBI, directly responsible for identifying suspects for deportation and 
internment, was home to some of the most poorly informed U.S. officials working in Latin 
America.”346
Because they had “no reliable sources of their own, the FBI agents established close 
working relationships with local police forces” with mixed results.
  
347
Asking police or military leaders in countries ruled by dictatorships for the names 
of dangerous Germans often yielded a list of the dictator’s personal enemies, or 
the owners of attractive real estate coveted by his friends.  And the local police 
officers did not necessarily display the requisite talent or honesty needed for 
effective investigation.




                                                 
342 Friedman, supra note 32 at 59. 
343 Id. at 60. 
344 See id. at 60-62. 
345 See id. at 62. 
346 Id. at 64. 
347 Id. at 66. 
348 Id. 
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By 1943, the U.S. Justice Department expressed serious concerns about the “dangerousness” 
classifications, which were often assigned to detainees by the FBI without prior investigation or 
evaluation of the credibility of the information upon which the classification was based.349
In addition, because most U.S. officials were unfamiliar with the local society and unable 
to speak Spanish or German, they had to rely on local police and any other informants who 
showed up at their door.
 
350  The U.S. often paid informants to denounce local Nazis to the U.S. 
consulate.351  However, paying bounties for information created a problem: “The trouble with 
paid informants is that they are paid only if they have material to provide – a structural incentive 
to invent information that contributed greatly to the inflation of the German threat in U.S. 
assessments.”352  Persons with grudges often turned in one another for reasons unrelated to 
national security; for example, landlord tenant disputes or disgruntled former lovers.353
All of these same problems have been identified in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the 
Middle East in the current “war on terror.”  For example, Major General Michael Flynn, the 
United States’ most senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan, has criticized information 
gathering there by the United States, calling U.S. intelligence about Afghanistan “clueless.”
 
354  
Just as it offered bounties during WWII, the United States has also air-dropped flyers in 
Afghanistan offering large monetary rewards for information about suspected terrorists or 
Taliban members.355
                                                 
349 Fox, supra note 21, at 131. 
  Many persons in Afghanistan used this offer as an opportunity to settle 
350 Friedman, supra note 32 at 67. 
351 Id. at 68.   
352 Id.  
353 See Max Paul Friedman, Trading Civil Liberties for National Security: Warnings from a World War II 
Internment Program, 17 J. Pol’y Hist. 294, 296 (2005). 
354 Martin Evans, U.S. military chief brands Afghan intelligence mission ‘clueless’, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 5, 2010), 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6935138/US-military-chief-brands-
Afghan-intelligence-mission-clueless.html. 
355 See Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of 
Department of Defense Data 23-25 (Feb. 8, 2006), available at 
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tribal grudges and get rid of rivals.356  Studies show that 93% of the detainees held at 
Guantanamo Bay were not captured by U.S. forces.357  The U.S. Commander in charge of 
Guantanamo Bay detainees was quoted as saying: “Sometimes, we just didn't get the right folks. 
. . .  Commanders now estimate that up to 40% of the 549 current detainees probably pose no 
threat and possess no significant information.”358  As of 2009, three-quarters of the 774 prisoners 
sent to Guantanamo have been released.359  The U.S. government also has repeatedly stated that 
it does not have sufficient personnel with the necessary skills in language, culture, and 
appropriate intelligence gathering techniques to allow for full and effective communication in 
Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries.360
Another parallel between the U.S. Latin American Detention Program in WWII and the 
fight against terrorism today is that the United States responded to the threat in each case by 
creating a registration program for certain aliens.  At the Third Meeting of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in 1942, Resolution XVII was adopted 
recommending that all aliens be required to register and periodically report in person to the 
proper authorities and that strict supervision be exercised over the activities of all nationals of 
member States of the Tripartite Pact.
   
361
                                                                                                                                                             
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf (One leaflet reads: “Get 
wealth and power beyond your dreams.  Help the Anti-Taliban Forces rid Afghanistan of murderers and terrorists.”). 
   
356 See Andy Worthington, THE GUANTANAMO FILES 178-79, 183 (2007). See Andy Worthington, Report on ex-
Guantanamo Prisoners Reveals Systematic Abuse and Chronic Failures of Intelligence (Jun. 18, 2008), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-worthington/report-on-ex-guantanamo-p_b_107728.html; see also Tom 
Lasseter, America’s prison for terrorists often held wrong men (Jun. 15, 2008), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/story/38773.html.   
357 See Denbeaux, supra note 355 at 14. 




359 See Andy Worthington, THE GUANTANAMO FILES 178 (2007). 
360 See, e.g., Andy Worthington, THE GUANTANAMO FILES 129-30 (2007). 
361 Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Comm. for Political Def., Appendix at 55 (1943). 
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The majority of the American Republics responded positively to this recommendation, 
adopting or updating laws that required the registration and identification of aliens within their 
territory.  The Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense later 
adopted Resolution VI in 1942 on the Registration of Aliens, which encouraged any State that 
had not already done so to adopt similar laws and set forth recommended minimum standards for 
any such program.362
Likewise, shortly after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, 
the United States implemented a new registration program for Arabs and Muslims in the United 
States.
 
363  The U.S. Justice Department selected more than 50,000 young immigrant men for 
interviews, virtually all of whom were Arabs or Muslims.364  On September 11, 2002, the Justice 
Department initiated a new program requiring foreign nationals from selected countries to 
register at entry and at one-year intervals thereafter.365  It also applied similar requirements to all 
male nonimmigrants over the age of 16 who were already living in the United States.366  Once 
again, virtually all of the targeted countries of nationality were Arab or Muslim.367  These 
programs are essentially a form of racial profiling, which has been criticized as an ineffective 
law enforcement tool368
                                                 
362 Id. at 56. 
 and has been limited due to concerns that it may violate the Fourth 
363 Information about the former National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) also known as Special 
Registration is available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/id_visa/nseers/.  Although on its face, NSEERS 
appears to apply to all nonimmigrants arriving in the United States, in practice, it was used to target Arabs and 
Muslims.  See Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Special Registration: Discrimination and 
Xenophobia as Government Policy 4 (Nov. 2003) (and citations therein), available at 
http://www.citylimits.org/images_pdfs/pdfs/SpecialRegistrationReport.pdf.  
364 David Cole, ENEMY ALIENS 49 (2003). 
365 Id. at 50. 
366 Id. 
367 Id. 
368 Friedman, supra note 353 at 302. 
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Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws.369
During World War II, the Americas justified the Latin American detention program by 
arguing that the new threat presented by the Axis powers necessitated the adoption of new laws, 
some of which may be less respectful of civil liberties.  For example, one annual report of the 
Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense states: 
  
Peace-time legislation could not meet the Axis pattern of total attack, predicated 
on an intense and world-wide campaign of political aggression, any more than the 
Panzer division or the Stuka bomber could be checked by the primitive 
technology of trench warfare.  Laws not drafted in contemplation of the 
widespread subversive organization of totalitarian agents, and which do not take 
into account their ever-changing tactics and maneuvers, cannot offer the legal, 
administrative or psychological basis for an effective political defense and a 
vigorous counter-attack.370
 
   
Likewise, the Bush Administration repeatedly responded to its critics with similar 
reasoning, arguing that international law was developed for relations between States, not for non-
state actors like terrorist organizations.371  It has been further argued that terrorist organizations 
present a new kind of threat requiring new kinds of responses, including the development of new 
laws.  For example, in an address to a joint session of Congress shortly after the terrorist attacks 
of 2001, President Bush stated: “Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on 
thousands of civilians.  All of this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a 
different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.”372
                                                 
369 U.S. CONST. amend IV and XIV.  See also Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the 
Economics, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1275, 1278 (2004). 
  He also states that “we face 
370 Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Comm. for Political Def. 25 (1943). 
371 For example, President Bush determined that the Geneva Conventions are not applicable to the fight against 
terrorism because it is not a conflict between High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions.  See 
Memorandum from The White House for the Vice President et al., “Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees” (Feb. 7, 1992). 
372 Address of President George W. Bush to Joint Session of Congress (Sep. 20, 2001) available at 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ 
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new and sudden national challenges” and that “[w]e will come together to give law enforcement 
the additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home.”373  In 2002, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft stated: “This unprecedented assault brought us face to face with a new enemy, and 
demanded that we think anew and act anew in order to protect our citizens and our values.”374  
This theme continued through 2005, when President Bush stated in a press conference, “we 
quickly learned that al Qaeda was not a conventional enemy . . . This new threat required us to 
think and act differently.”375  He then describes the new law enforcement tools created by the 
Patriot Act,376 many of which have been criticized as improperly infringing on individual 
liberties.377
In WWII,  various U.S. officials sometimes argued that since the enemy violated the law, 
the enemy should not benefit from legal protections.  However, the United States has been 
somewhat schizophrenic in its adherence to this argument.  For example, in the Explanatory 
Statement to Resolution XX on the Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Nationals, the 
CPD Defense stated: 
 
[I]n exercising their powers of detention and expulsion, the American Republics, 
including those not at war with the Axis, have wisely concluded that the Axis 
should not be permitted to take advantage of domestic respect for traditional 
concepts of International Law in order to continue their reprehensible activities in 
                                                 
373 Id. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reiterated this point stating, “The problem is that, to a large extent, we are in 
unexplored territory with this unconventional and complex struggle against extremism.  Traditional doctrines 
covering criminal and military prisoners do not apply well enough.”  Bender & Savage, Guantanamo Must Stay 
Open, Rumsfeld says, The Boston Globe (Jun. 15, 2008). 
374 John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 
Concerning the Oversight of the Department of Justice (Jul. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2002/072502agtestimony.htm.   
375 See President George W. Bush Press Conference, Dec. 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/19/bush.transcript/index.html 
376 See id. Attorney General Ashcroft also pointed to the USA-Patriot Act’s modernization of surveillance tools as 
part of the new system and laws adopted in the war on terrorism.  See John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United 
States, before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Concerning the Oversight of the Department of Justice 
(Jul. 25, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2002/072502agtestimony.htm. 
377 See, e.g., Larry Abramson, The Patriot Act: Alleged Abuses of the Law, NPR (July 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4756403. 
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this Hemisphere, using as protection for their machinations the guarantees of the 
very democracy they are seeking to destroy.378
 
 
Yet, one paragraph later, the Committee recommends that the American Republics follow the 
detention guidelines set forth in the Geneva Conventions of July 27, 1929 relative to the 
treatment of prisoners of war.379  This recommendation was not made for purely humanitarian 
reasons, however.  The Committee wanted to follow the Convention to try to ensure reciprocal 
treatment for American citizens held in Axis-dominated territory.380
 The historical record described above shows that the United States detained German 
nationals during WWII in part to prevent them from assisting the enemy, whether militarily by 
returning to the battlefield or economically by supplying the enemy with needed goods.  
Likewise, several U.S. government officials have recently asserted that it is necessary to detain 
suspected enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict to prevent their return to the 
battlefield.  For example, in a 2002 Department of Defense briefing, then Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld stated: “As has been the case in previous wars, the country that takes prisoners 
generally decides that they would prefer them not to go back to the battlefield.  They detain those 
enemy combatants for the duration of the conflict.”
  
381
In Hamdi, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this reasoning, stating that “detention to 
prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war.”
   
382
                                                 
378 Explanatory Statement to Resolution XX on Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis Nationals (1943), in 
Appendix to the Annual Report of the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense 77 
(1943). 
  The 
problem in both cases, however, is that many of the persons arrested and detained were not 
379 Id. at 78.  The Committee recognized that the Convention was not strictly applicable because it referred only to 
prisoners of war and not civilians.   
380 Id.  
381 Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense Briefing (Mar. 28, 2002), quoted in Mark Denbeaux et al., 
Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense Data 4 
(Feb. 8, 2006), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf.   
382 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004). 
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enemy combatants and had no intention of fighting on the battlefield.383
Just as jurisdiction was established over Germans from Latin America by accusing them 
of being alien enemies and bringing them to the United States during World War II for detention 
and trial; likewise, the U.S. asserts jurisdiction over accused alien unlawful enemy combatants 
captured elsewhere and brought to Guantanamo Bay as part of the current war on terror.  In both 
time periods, many of these persons were to have hearings outside regular U.S. courts in other 
types of tribunals.  As of today, only a handful of trials by military commission are underway, in 
part because of the multiplicity of legal challenges to the lack of procedural protections afforded 
the defendants in the proposed military tribunals.
  The United States is 
still struggling to create a system that is capable of properly distinguishing between those who do 
present a threat and those who do not.  In addition, in the current war on terror, no end to the 
hostilities is in sight, leading to the specter of indefinite detention.  Lengthy detentions have 
brought demands for hearings to determine whether the proper persons were being detained. 
384
In reviewing these challenges, the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance 
of deference to the authority of the President in the face of a serious threat to national security, 
but has also reminded us that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes 
to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”
 
385  Because the war on terror may be indefinite, the Court 
has held that detainees are entitled to some measure of due process.386  However, the Court has 
said that certain evidentiary rules may be relaxed due to the government’s need to maintain focus 
and secrecy in its war on terror.387
                                                 
383 See Fox, supra note 21 at 106 (“Secretary of State James Byrnes had admitted in 1945 that deportation mistakes 
were made in Latin America.”). 
   
384 A list of the persons being tried by military commission may be found at, 
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx. 
385 Id. at 536.  Hamdi was a U.S. citizen. 
386 See id. at 533. 
387 See id. 
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 As noted above, the United States’ use of military commissions was challenged in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,388 where the Supreme Court held that the government may use military 
commissions, but must do so in a manner consistent with domestic and international law.  
According to the Court, military commissions have been used “to seize and subject to 
disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede the military effort 
have violated the law of war.”389   However, the Supreme Court found several major procedural 
deficiencies with the military commission procedures, leading the court to stop their use until 
those deficiencies were addressed.  The Supreme Court again considered challenges to the use of 
military commissions to determine combatant status in Boumediene v. Bush.390  Here, too, the 
Court noted several deficiencies in the procedures to be used by the CRSTs.391
VI. Lessons to be Learned 
  Following these 
cases, the U.S. government has apparently corrected many of these procedural deficiencies 
through the new MMC.  Therefore, it may be that the military commissions now more fully 
comply with both U.S. and international law.  
Many criticisms have been leveled at the United States for its internment of persons of 
Japanese and German nationality or ancestry during World War II.  Despite some changes in 
both domestic and international law, as described above, criticisms continue to be leveled at the 
United States for its detention and trial of unlawful enemy combatants or suspected terrorists.  
Thus, while it appears that the United States may have learned some lessons from history, there 
is clearly more to learn.  As the U.S. Supreme Court recently stated in Hamdi:  “History and 
common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries with it the potential to 
                                                 
388 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
389 Id., citing Quirin. 
390 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). 
391 Id. at 2260. 
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become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of [immediate 
national security] threat.”392
In his book, Enemy Aliens, David Cole describes the United States’ tendency in times of 
crisis to sacrifice the liberty of non-United States citizens in exchange for a sense of greater 
security for U.S. citizens.
  The U.S. government must continue to work towards doing a better 
job of balancing national security and individual liberties.  
393  Cole argues that striking the balance between liberty and security in 
this way is tempting because citizens retain their rights, while the targeted noncitizens have no 
voice in the political process to protest their treatment.394  However, Cole argues that the United 
States should resist the temptation to trade the liberty of foreign nationals for the security of 
United States citizens for four reasons.395
First, the distinction between citizens and noncitizens is illusory in the long run.  What 
we allow our government to do to immigrants today becomes a template for how the government 
treats citizens tomorrow.
   
396
Second, restricting liberties of noncitizens is likely to prove counterproductive as a 
security matter because it undermines our legitimacy and hinders law enforcement’s ability to 
work effectively with local communities.
  
397  Both historically and today, the United States has 
suffered a loss of reputation in the international community for its failure to abide by the rule of 
law and to respect human rights.398
                                                 
392 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530. 
  This loss of reputation has in turn undermined the United 
393 Cole, supra note 364 at 4. 
394 Id. at 4-5. 
395 Id. at 7. 
396 Id. 
397 Id. at 8-9 
398 See Fox, supra note 353 at 302; Elaine Sciolino, Spanish Judge Calls for Closing U.S. Prison at Guantanamo, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/04/world/europe/04terror.html (“In a 
speech last month, Britain's attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, called on the United States to close Guantánamo, 
saying, ‘The historic tradition of the U.S. as a beacon of freedom, liberty and justice deserves the removal of this 
symbol.’”) 
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States’ ability to carry out its agenda on an international scale, whether that is fighting terrorism, 
state building, or combating the drug trade.399  In the international fight against terrorism, where 
the terrorists operate in multiple countries, such international contributions and cooperation are 
essential.400
  Third, treating noncitizens as having fewer rights often is a critical factor in the later 
regretted pattern of government overreaction in times of crises.
   
401  And fourth, Cole argues that 
trading foreigners’ rights for citizens’ security is constitutionally and morally wrong.402
Both the WWII-era U.S. Latin American Detention Program and the current fight against 
terrorism exemplify many of Cole’s themes.  While none of the persons detained in the Latin 
American Detention Program were U.S. citizens, the restrictions on liberties of noncitizens 
during WWII led directly to McCarthyism following the war and the corresponding restrictions 
on the individual freedoms of U.S. citizens.
   
403
As has also been described above, the U.S. Latin American Detention Program was not 
particularly effective in identifying persons who were true threats to the United States.  While the 
current war on terror may ultimately result in a better success rate, the U.S. government has 
admitted that large numbers of those initially detained are not connected to the Taliban or Al 
  By contrast, both citizens and noncitizens have 
been accused of being enemy combatants in the last ten years and have been subjected to 
unconstitutional practices, demonstrating again how easily the lines may blur.   
                                                 
399 See Cole, supra note 364 at 10 (and sources cited in fn 16). See also Release and Review of the Subcommittee 
Report: “The Decline in America's Reputation: Why?” Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, 
Human Rights, and Oversight, 110th Cong. 20-21 (2008) (statement of Esther Brimmer, PhD., Deputy Director and 
Director of Research for the Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International 
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400 McDonnell, supra note 309 at 178 (“Al Qaeda reportedly has cells in over 100 countries.  To gather intelligence 
on such a diffused enemy requires cooperation from many countries.”) 
401 Cole, supra note 364 at 7, 10.  In his book, JUSTICE AT WAR, Peter Irons documented the government’s zeal in 
rounding up and locking up Japanese Americans during WWII, which included the use of tainted evidence to secure 
convictions.  Peter Irons, JUSTICE AT WAR (1993).  The court relied in part on evidence of government 
misrepresentations in overturning the conviction of Fred Korematsu.   
402 Id. at 7. 
403 See id. at chapters 7 & 8; see also Krammer, supra note 87 at 173. 
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Qaeda.  These numbers point to government overreaction to a threat in both time periods.  These 
programs also wasted precious government resources during times of crisis on many persons 
who were ultimately determined to be not particularly dangerous.404
If the United States is going to continue to rely on unknown informants and use bounties 
to identify suspected enemy aliens, it needs to do more investigation before deciding to remove 
the suspect from his or her country of nationality for detention and trial elsewhere.  One option 
would be to conduct hearings in the country where the person is apprehended, as contemplated 
under Article 5 of Geneva Convention III, to make an initial determination as to whether the 
person actually is a threat to the United States.
 
405
And while the Supreme Court upheld the government’s program of detaining persons of 
Japanese or German descent during WWII, most people now regard those decisions as wrong.  In 
the current war on terror, the Supreme Court has been somewhat more willing to review the 
executive branch’s actions and measure them against the requirements of individual rights such 
as due process.  And the executive branch of government has responded to these court decisions 
by increasing procedural protections for persons being tried by military commissions, as is 
demonstrated by the most recent version of the Rules for Military Commissions. 
  International law creates a presumption in 
favor of detention in occupied territory or a location closer to that person’s home to prevent 
return to the battlefield if that person is determined to be a threat. 
In his book, Cole’s primary purpose is to show that the phenomenon of government 
overreaction is inextricably tied to the double standards the United States employs with respect 
to citizens and noncitizens in times of crisis.406
                                                 
404 See Fox, supra note 353 at 303. 
  He suggests that to the correct the problem, we 
treat citizens and noncitizens equally with respect to basic constitutional rights such as due 
405 Geneva Convention III, supra note 299 at art. 5. 
406 Cole, supra note 364 at 229. 
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process, equal protection, and the First Amendment freedoms of religion, speech and 
association.407  As another scholar has stated: “It is . . . precisely during times of war or other 
perceived crises – times that our civil liberties are most easily lost – that we must most diligently 
guard our rights and insist on lawful conduct by the government.”408
VII. Conclusion 
  As the comparison between 
the U.S. Latin American Detention Program and the current war on terror shows, we have made 
strides in that direction.  However, there is still more work to be done to find the proper balance 
between individual liberties and national security.  
Many actions were taken against persons believed to be enemy aliens during WWII over which 
the United States now expresses serious regret.  While perhaps technically legal at the time, the 
mass arrests, deportations, and lengthy detentions of accused alien enemies on the basis of often 
specious evidence was unjust, a waste of resources, and damaging to the U.S. reputation abroad.  
The United States appears to have learned some lessons from that experience.  In the current 
fight against terrorism, U.S. courts are providing more stringent review of government action to 
protect individual rights and the U.S. government is responding to those court directives by 
providing greater protections.  However, the U.S. government still initially went too far in 
favoring national security over individual liberties when faced with terrorist threats.  As in 
WWII, it arrested and detained many persons on flimsy allegations, transported them far from 
home, locked them up indefinitely, and limited their procedural rights when they demanded 
hearings to prove their innocence.  Thus, while the United States has exorcised many of the 
ghosts from the World War II Latin American Detention Program, some of those ghosts still 
haunt Guantanamo. 
                                                 
407 Id. at 233. 
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